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ABSTRACT
Comesongsri, Veti. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May, 2010. Motivations
for the Avoidance of Phishing Threat. Major Professor: Thomas F. Stafford, Ph.D.
Phishing attacks and other information security problems are major issues facing
individuals and organizations in the internet age. For protection against phishing attacks,
the individual needs to maintain some form of phishing protection with ongoing
maintenance cost but without any immediate benefit. However, failing to maintain this
protection may result in potentially negative effects, such as identity theft. Problems such
as this one are largely ignored by the management information systems (MIS) literature.
Instead, more general behavioral models that focus on the type of behavior that has clear
perceived immediate benefits have been used to explain this type of behavior.
This study adopted the protection motivation theory (PMT) as an underlying
theoretical model. The main focuses of the PMT are the possible negative impacts of a
threat and the potential effectiveness of protective behaviors that can be directly applied
to the threat—in this case, computer security threats. The PMT model developed here
was further improved to address its weakness by applying related concepts from the
theory of planned behavior and the cognitive dissonance theory.
The research method employed in this study was a survey-based method. The
final sample consisted of 376 college students. The results from the survey indicated that
the research model is substantially able to explain the intention to perform recommended
phishing protections. The results also showed that to influence an individual’s intention
to protect him or herself against phishing attempts, the intervention message should
persuade the individual to believe that the threat is real and could be severe; that the
current behavior is not effective against the threat; that the individual can successfully
iii

perform the recommended protection; that the cost of protection is reasonable; that
responding to phishing does not have any benefit; and that the recommended protection is
effective.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
Information security has become problematic for both organizations and
individuals due to the reliance that each places on information systems for its daily
business. One of the major security weaknesses in these systems is the end user (Gross &
Rosson, 2007; Peltier, 2006; Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001; Schneier, 2004), and
security lapses frequently occur when end users engage in risky behaviors when using
computers, such as opening file attachments from unknown e-mail sources, downloading
and installing unauthorized software, and visiting unauthorized web sites. The
motivations for security lapses can range from naiveté to benevolence and even malice
(Stanton, Caldera, Isaac, Stam, & Marcinkowski, 2003). Moreover, users may not even
be aware of the risky security behaviors that they engage in, resulting in threats to their
systems and to themselves.
Considering the varying forms of risky computer-use behaviors that gain
substantial attention, responding to phishing exploits are especially problematic. There
are numerous security threats that can arise from phishing. For instance, many phishing
e-mails contain malicious software (referred to as malware) applications that can damage
computers, steal personal information, and mount attacks on computers. Aside from
malware threats, many phishing e-mails attempt to persuade users to give away personal
information, which makes the users vulnerable to identity theft. The U.S. Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) reports that identity theft has been increasing annually and that nearly
3.2 million American were victims of identity theft in 2007 (FTC, 2009). The Gartner
Group indicates that the average cost to an individual for identify theft is around $3,250,
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which does not include the time or trouble required to restore identity and credit history
files (McCall, 2007).
Several questions are posed by end user’s behaviors in regard to phishing
attempts: (1) Do end users understand the risks of responding to phishing? (2) If end
users do understand the risks, how do they consider such risks relative to the likely
impact that these risks will have upon their own personal safety and computer security?
(3) Why do end users respond to phishing messages in the face of potential loss and
security risks? (4) What can be done to mediate and correct this potentially destructive
and harmful use of computer systems?
To answer these questions, a behavioral model that addresses the risks and
impacts of negative consequences arising from unsecure and/or risky computer-use
behaviors is required. The major behavioral theories that guide the understanding of use
of computer systems in management information systems (MIS) include the technology
acceptance model (TAM), the theory of reasoned action (TRA), and the theory of
planned behavior (TPB). The TAM (Davis, 1986, 1989) has been used to explain the
acceptance and adoption of new technologies, ideas, and practices. While the TAM has
been successful in the area of describing affirmative technology acceptance and adoption
behaviors, it has limited power to explain behaviors negatively related to acceptance or
adoption. Moreover, many of the TAM constructs cannot be applied to explain risky
behavior such as responding to phishing, since the TAM does not address the potential
risks of adoption behaviors.
The TRA (Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977) and
the TPB (which is an extension of TRA) (Ajzen, 1988, 1991) are some of the most
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prominent behavioral theories in psychology (Francis et al., 2004). These are welldefined and well-developed general behavioral theories that have been applied in a wide
range of circumstances, including in the consideration of risky behaviors. Both the TRA
and the TPB have been used to explain risky behaviors, particularly in the health
behavior literature, although applications of these theories in MIS have determined that
the TRA and the TPB each have less explanatory power than the TAM in understanding
technology-acceptance behavior (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003).
Considering the range of behavioral theories that could be used to explain risky
computer-use behaviors, the models of technology use and acceptance that have been
used to characterize proactive computer-use practices do not work as well as the theories
intended to explain the destructive practices involved in risky computer-use behavior. For
purposes of explaining behavior related to potential harm arising from inappropriate
behaviors, the protection motivation theory (PMT) is a leading candidate. A main
objective of the PMT is to explain the reasons why people decide to either continue risky
computer-use behavior or to accept recommendations aimed at encouraging protective
action against risk threats (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1975, 1983; Rogers &
Prentice-Dunn, 1997). While a majority of the PMT research has been performed in the
field of health protection, it has also been applied to other sorts of risk-laden behaviors
that policy-makers might wish to discourage or otherwise proactively influence, such as
speeding while driving, protecting the environment, and preventing nuclear war.
However, despite its success as a theory guiding health protection behaviors, the PMT
has never gained wide popularity in other fields. Perhaps this is because, as Witte (1992a)
pointed out, the PMT can be used to generally explain why people are motivated to

3

protect themselves but often fails to fully explain why people reject recommended actions
in support of safe behavior. In spite of these weaknesses, the PMT appears to be a better
model for understanding risky and potentially harmful computer-use behaviors than the
many affirmative acceptance and adoption models that have evolved in the literature.
There is still considerable room for improvement in the adaptation of the PMT to
computer security and harmful computer-use behavior—this study contributes to that
process.
Objective
The primary goal of this study is to understand how to motivate people to protect
themselves against risky behavior while using computers. The relationships in the PMT
provide guidelines to address this goal. First, to understand the behavior, there is a need
to understand how people evaluate the risks arising from their computer-use behaviors.
Based on PMT, if people think their behaviors are risky enough to represent tangible and
likely harm, they may try to find alternative behaviors in an effort to protect themselves.
However, there is a need to understand how people evaluate these alternative behaviors in
order to effectively promote them in the interests of bolstering computer security and safe
computing practices. Based on the PMT, people can be expected to accept recommended
actions to correct risky behaviors if they believe that the advocated actions can protect
them and that they have the capability to perform those actions. As applied to a computer
security context focused on the harms potentially arising from phishing, several research
questions can be posed in this regard:
1. Why do people engage in risky computing behaviors, such as responding to
phishing?
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2. How do people evaluate the risks for these unsecure practices?
a. How does the severity of potential threats arising from the activity
influence overall threat assessments related to engaging in the activity?
b. How does the vulnerability to computer security hazards arising from
phishing influence overall threat assessments?
c. How do people combine the potential severity of security threats and the
likely vulnerability to security threats in their threat assessments and
subsequent decisions related to risky computing behavior?
3. How do people evaluate recommended actions targeted toward reducing computer
security threats?
a. How does the potential effectiveness of recommended protective actions
influence the subsequent assessment of recommended protective actions?
b. How does the self-perceived ability to perform recommended protective
actions influence the assessment of such recommended actions?
c. How does the cost of recommended protective actions influence the
assessments of such recommended actions?
4. How do computer users’ threat assessments and perceptions of recommended
protective actions influence their intentions to engage in recommended protective
actions targeted at increasing safe computing behavior?
To answer these questions, this research study will propose several logical
revisions of the PMT to make it more applicable to computer security contexts. Some
constructs in the subsequent model will be redefined on the basis of comparable TPB
constructs, which are more theoretically refined for purposes of understanding computer-
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use behavior than are the PMT constructs. There will be no new theoretical constructs
introduced to the generic PMT model taken from the health protection literature, but new
relationships among existing PMT constructs will be proposed. Specifically, interactions
among existing constructs in the revised PMT computing model will be hypothesized on
the basis of logical reasoning and empirical evidence. Lastly, a model of persuasion
effects will be incorporated to explain the likely acceptance or rejection of messages
advocating safe computer use. A new measurement model of threat severity and
vulnerability will also be proposed, and the subsequent modified model of protection
motivation will be tested with empirical data related to protections against phishing
behavior.
Significance of the Study
The results from this study will be important to both academics and practitioners.
The findings will help researchers and managers better understand the user psychology of
risky computer-use behaviors. From this knowledge, effective intervention programs that
help reduce the rates of risky computer-use behaviors can be designed. As stated,
phishing has become a significant societal problem. As the number of phishing exploits
increase, an increasing amount of information systems budgeting is allocated to combat
the problem. Gartner estimates that market size of antiphishing and antispam tools could
reach $880 million in 2008 (McCall, 2007). A better understanding of computer-use
behaviors related to phishing messages can aid in the design of behavioral-intervention
programs that can reduce such risky computer-se practices, and the results from the
proposed study will help practitioners understand the underlying cognitive process of
computer users in evaluating computer security risks and adopting advocated responses
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to such risks. This understanding will help organizations design antiphishing intervention
programs that use both technology and managerial practices to reduce risky activities.
The results from this study can also be generalized to other security risk behaviors to help
practitioners design intervention programs in support of computer security policies,
computer security awareness programs, and computer security training.
In terms of academic contributions, this study is the first to attempts to merge
protection motivation theory with theories of planned behavior. Similarities between the
PMT and the TPBs have been noted (Weinstein, 1993). In his review of four competing
theories in health-protective behaviors (i.e., TPB, PMT, health belief model, and
subjective expected utility theory), Weinstein (1993) found that all four theories share
many constructs and relationships. While the TPBs can be used in broader and more
general ways, the PMT can be viewed as a special case of planned behavior in which the
behavior in question is risk-laden. Hence, in this study, the theoretical similarities
between the PMT and TPBs will lead to a redefinition of specific PMT constructs to
better align with the TPB model. A notable outcome of this process will include a more
direct comparison between results and effects of the TPBs and the PMT.
As an aspect of this study, the PMT will be further developed to facilitate its use
with more general ranges of behavior. Traditionally, the PMT has been applied to
behaviors related to fear. But in this study, the PMT will be framed in a problem-solving
model where threat evaluation is construed as problem recognition and response
evaluation is operationalized as solution evaluation. This will relax the assumption of
fear-induced response in the traditional views of the PMT and expand the theory for more
general application in a broader range of contexts in future research. A main outcome of

7

this revision will be the ability to apply the PMT to risky behaviors in organizational
contexts. A notable implication of this outcome will be interventions and security
awareness programs for the workplace that can be designed to effectively make users
aware of the problem without generating fear, which may lead to reductions in personnel
morale.
Hence, the PMT model will be modified in a number of ways. Interactions among
existing constructs in the model will be introduced. Additional theoretical relationships
will also be added, which will enable us to use the PMT to explain phenomena that
previously did not fit its theoretical context. Finally, a persuasion model will be provided
as a conceptual enhancement of the overall model to augment the interpretation of
traditional PMT formulations to explain why people accept or reject the information
about security threats and recommended protective actions.
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CHAPTER 2:
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review for this study serves two purposes: (1) A comprehensive
review of current literature directly related to the research questions at-hand will serve as
a foundation for further research, and (2) A review of research that may not be directly
related to the problem may improve our basic understanding and help build a more
comprehensive research model for the current study.
The research model in this study is based on the protection motivation theory
(PMT) (Rogers, 1975, 1983; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). The proposed improvement
to the model came from the related research based on persuasion, fear appeals, and attitude
change. The literature review begins with an overview of the literature on phishing. This is
followed by a discussion of the strengths and limitations of the PMT. The next section
provides a review of attitude-based behavioral models (i.e., the theory of reasoned action
[TRA] and the theory of planned behavior [TPB]). Next, literature relating to attitude
change by persuasion is reviewed. Finally, a research model is developed by combining
the concepts from the PMT, the TPB, and the persuasion theory.
Phishing Research
The literature on phishing can be can be grouped into three major research streams,
as shown in Table 1. The first group includes technical literature that focuses on technical
aspects of phishing, such as spoofing techniques and phishing detection algorithms. The
second type of phishing literature includes design science research that focuses on human
computer interfaces (HCI) or other design factors that help end users identify phishing
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attempts. Research in the third general group focuses on attributes of phishing messages
and behavioral responses of end users to phishing attempts.

Table 1
Examples of Phishing Literature
Author

Journal/Outlet

Type

Sample

Berghel (2006)

Communications of the ACM
(CACM)

Technical

N.A.

Bose & Leung (2007)

Communications of the AIS
(CAIS)

Technical

N.A.

Dhamija, Tygar, &
Hearst (2006)

Conference on Human Factors
Computing Systems (CHI)

Human computer
interfaces (HCI)

Student

Dinev (2006)

CACM

Technical

N.A.

Dodge, Carver, &
Ferguson (2007)

Computers & Security

Behavior

Student

Dong, Clark, & Jacob
(2008)

2008 Conference on Human
System Interaction

HCI

N.A.

Downs, Holbrook, &
Cranor (2006)

Symposium on Usable Privacy
and Security

Mental model

Inexperienced
user

Downs, Holbrook, &
Cranor (2007)

Anti-Phishing Working Group
(APWG): eCrime Researchers
Summit

Behavioral

University
staff, faculty,
and student

Egelman, Cranor, &
Hong (2008)

CHI 2008

HCI

General user

Fette, Sadeh, &
Tomasic (2006)

Carnegie Mellon cyber
laboratory technical report

Technical

N.A.

Herzberg (2009)

Computers & Security

HCI

N.A.

Jagatic, Johnson,
Jakobsson, & Menczer
(2007)

CACM

Behavioral

Student

Kruck & Kruck (2006)

Journal of Computer
Information Systems

Technical

N.A.

LaRose, Rifon, &
Enbody (2008)

CACM

Behavioral

Student

Moore & Clayton
(2007)

Workshop on the Economics of
Information Security

Technical and
management

N.A.
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Table 1 (continued)
Author

Journal/Outlet

Type

Sample

Schechter, Dhamija,
Ozment, & Fischer
(2007)

Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers
Symposium on Security and
Privacy

HCI

Bank customer

Soghoian (2008)

APWG eCrime Researchers
Summit

Legal

N.A.

The technical literature on phishing generally provides characteristics of phishing
messages and websites, such as spoofing techniques, design elements, and social aspects
of the phishing message. In addition, most of the technical literature suggests
countermeasures that rely on both technical and managerial approaches. It is important to
note that all of the technical literature recommends end user security education as the
most effective way to counter phishing threats.
Most of the HCI literature focuses on design variables that provide phishing clues
and on warning messages that web browsers and e-mail clients present to users in
response to phishing attempts. Most of these studies found that users ignore clues and
warning messages about possible phishing messages and website spoofs. Some of them
suggest better ways to warn users about threats, such as the use of active warnings instead
of passive warnings (Egelman, Cranor, & Hong, 2008). While all of the HCI literature
recommends solving the problem with better user interfaces, many HCI studies also
recommend educating users about phishing threats and how to detect these threats.
Most of the behavioral research on phishing is in the form of laboratory
experiments, with the notable exception of Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson, and Menczer
(2007), who conducted a phishing experiment by sending real spoof messages to the
11

subjects. Jagatic et al. (2007) found that social phishing, which involves highly
customized messages that include some social cues targeted at the recipient, was highly
effective compared to generic phishing messages. The experiment by Dodge, Carver, and
Ferguson (2007) found that almost half of their student subjects failed to identify
phishing e-mails of this sort in a laboratory setting. They also found that the subjects who
received more security training were better at identifying phishing attempts than subjects
with less training.
Downs, Holbrook, and Cranor (2007) found that situational cues and general
awareness about phishing can help subjects better identify phishing exploits. However,
the perceived severity of each spoof message did not increase the percentage of subjects
who identified phishing attempts.
LaRose, Rifon, and Enbody (2008) found that subjects who were highly involved
with security issues were more likely to protect themselves than subjects that were not
concerned about security. In addition, security involvement also moderates the effects of
self-efficacy on intention to engage in security protection behaviors.
Fear Appeals Research
Protection motivation arises from fear appeals research in mass communications,
which itself lends to the research on persuasion. The Yale Communication Research
Program (Hovland, Janis, & Kelly, 1953) identified source, message, audience, and effect
as the main constructs of the persuasion process (see Figure 1). The “source” construct
refers to the characteristics of the communicator, including factors such as credibility.
Examples of “message” characteristics include implicit versus explicit content, low-fear
versus high-fear message appeals, and emotional versus logical message construction.
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Individual differences, such as personality and demographic characteristics, are the main
variables for the “audience” construct. And “effect,” which is the main independent
construct in the persuasion process, refers to the change in beliefs, attitudes, and
behaviors due to the persuasive communication. There is also an internal cognitive
mediating process posited where an audience receives and processes the message, which
leads to the effect.

Figure 1. Yale approach to communication and persuasion.

Fear appeals messages have received special attention in the literature because
they have unique characteristics as compared to other types of messages. As researchers
have come to understand the effects of fear appeals better, they have concluded that
moderate fear appeals are most effective (Janis, 1967). Too little or too much fear is not
as effective as moderate levels, since lower levels of fear have little or no persuasive
effect and too much fear can startle perceivers into avoidance and maladaptive responses
instead of taking the recommended actions.

13

Fear appeals messages have also been found to affect not only rational decisionmaking but also emotion (Janis, 1967; Tanner, Hunt, & Eppright, 1991). In some cases,
the effect of fear appeals on emotional responses leads to irrational behaviors or
maladaptive responses. However, fear appeals messages are a very effective persuasion
tool when used correctly. Audiences tend to pay more attention to fear appeals messages
than non-fear appeals messages, perhaps resulting from the effects of emotions arising
from fear appeals (Tanner et al., 1991; Witte, 1992a). Fear-based persuasion has been
used effectively throughout history by religious groups, politicians, and other institutions.
In general, messages that offer warnings about impending dangers or threats if an
audience fails to adopt the recommended action are the typical approaches used in fear
appeals persuasion. There are three major fear appeal theories, each built upon the one
that preceded it. The fear-as-acquired-drive model (Janis, 1967) was the first modern-day
theory on fear appeals. The next important theory was the parallel response model by
Leventhal (1970). The third model is Rogers’ protection motivation model (Rogers, 1975,
1983), which is the basis for the current research.
Fear-as-Acquired-Drive Model
The fear-as-acquired-drive model (Janis, 1967) focuses on people’s desire to reduce
fear. According to Janis (1967), fear arousal messages produce the drive for people to
reduce fear, and people tend to accept identified solutions that can help them reduce fear.
In general, the higher the level of fear arousal, the greater the chance that a person will
adopt recommendations to protect one’s self from danger. However, too much fear
arousal will result in defensive perceptual avoidance rather than danger-control actions
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arising from adopting the recommended action. The process model in Figure 2 shows the
three possible outcomes from three levels of fear arousal according to the drive model.
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Figure 2. Fear-as-acquired-drive process
Note. Based on Beck and Frankel (1981).
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According to the fear-as-acquired-drive model, if the threat message creates a low
level of fear, the low fear level will not be sufficient to create a motivation to protect
one’s self. Therefore, the recommended action will not be accepted. At the moderate
level of fear, the drive, which results from the desire to reduce fear, will motivate
perceivers to accept the recommended action. And at the high fear level, the fear drive is too
high and will result in defensive actions, such as perceptual avoidance of the fearinducing message or even hostility toward the message source. At this fear level, the fear
emotion will be reduced by avoidance rather than by accepting the recommended action.
The relationship between level of fear and effectiveness of persuasion can be plotted into
an inverted U-shaped curve, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Relationship of fear level and effectiveness of persuasion.

The major problem of the fear-as-acquired-drive model is that it lacks empirical
support (Beck & Frankel, 1981; Higbee, 1969; Leventhal, 1970), as the research based on
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this model has produced mixed results. Some studies found that lower levels of fear are
better than higher levels of fear, while some studies found no difference between the two.
However, most studies found higher levels of fear to be more persuasive than lower
levels of fear (Higbee, 1969). These findings can be partially attributed to methodology
problems; it may be that the fear level operationalized as “high” in some studies may not
have actually been strong enough to create the expected avoidance effect. The mixed
results and inconsistency of results in testing the drive model led to the rejection of the
approach in ongoing fear appeals research (Higbee, 1969; Leventhal, 1970; Rogers,
1983). Nonetheless, the drive model served as the foundation for subsequent views such
as the parallel process model and the protection motivation model.
Parallel Process Model
Studies by Leventhal during the 1960s led him to reject the fear-as-acquired-drive
model and propose the parallel process model as an alternative. The central proposition of
the parallel process model, as shown in Figure 4, is that there are two processes that occur
in parallel in response to fear appeals. The first process is the rational or cognitive
danger-control process, which serves to reduce danger. Another process is the fearcontrol process, a more emotional process, which serves to reduce fear. The outcome of a
perceiver’s response to the threat message depends on the process that is dominant in the
perceiver’s mind. If the danger-control process is more dominant, the recommended
action is likely to be accepted. However, if the emotional fear-control process is
dominant, people will resort to maladaptive avoidance responses and reject the
recommended action.
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Figure 4. The parallel response model.
Note. Based on Leventhal (1970).
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The parallel process model is not well-accepted because it lacks empirical
support. In addition, the model lacks specific operational rules for the separation of
danger-control and fear-control processes (Beck & Frankel, 1981). From the work done
on the model, there is no explanation as to when to expect one process to be more
dominant than the other. Despite its lack of empirical support, the parallel process model
is the first model that turns the focus of fear appeals from emotional processes to the
rational and cognitive processes on the part of perceivers.
Protection Motivation Theory
Rogers (1975) developed the protection motivation theory (PMT) in order to
create a more refined framework to study fear appeals and subsequent coping responses
by perceivers. The main purposes of this framework are to have a better-defined
conceptualization of the fear appeal itself and to understand the subsequent coping
process in detail. According to Rogers (1983), the fear-as-acquired-drive model is too
simplistic (i.e., fear is the only independent variable and the definition of fear is too
broad). The studies that are based on the fear-as-acquired-drive model manipulated fear
levels in different and perhaps incompatible ways, which makes them difficult to directly
compare. The general idea of the PMT, however, is that if perceivers realize that (1) the
damage from a threat is severe, (2) that the threat is inevitable, and (3) that they can
perform an effective protective action to avoid the threat, they will be motivated to
perform the advocated protective action. In an early version of the PMT, as shown in
Figure 5, Rogers (1983) proposed three main components of fear appeals communication,
which are similar to the expectancy-value theory.
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Figure 5. Schema of the Protection Motivation Theory.

The first component of a fear appeal is the magnitude of noxiousness, which
involves communicating the severity of the threat. This is comparable to the value
component of expectancy-value theory. The second component of a fear appeal is the
probability that the threat will be realized if there is no change in behavior (expectancy).
The last component of a fear appeal is the efficacy of the recommended response, which
helps to reduce or eliminate the threat (expectancy). According to the PMT, each of the
three components of the fear appeal communication initiates a respective and
independent cognitive process, in which perceivers evaluate the severity of the threat
event, the expectancy belief of vulnerability, and the perceived efficiency of the
recommend response. The value and expectancy from the cognitive mediating processes
are combined to arouse the motivation to protect one’s self, in which Rogers termed this
“protection motivation.” The intention to accept the recommended action is influenced by
the level of protection motivation aroused.
In addition, Rogers proposed that the combined effects of perceived threat
severity, expectancy of occurrence, and the efficacy of the response should be
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multiplicative. The reason for multiplication instead of addition is that if any of the three
components has zero effect (such as would be the case if a person perceived no chance of
threat occurrence), no matter how high the threat severity, he or she will not perceive the
threat as credible, and there will be no associated motivation to adopt the recommended
behavior. The same consideration pertains for the perceived efficacy of the threat
response; if people perceive that the recommended action is not effective (zero efficacy),
people should not have any motivation to protect themselves by accepting the
recommended action, even in the face of a credible threat.
Research using the original PMT model mostly supports the relationships of the
three main constructs in their influence on intention to change behavior. Manipulations of
each construct have an effect on intention (see Rogers [1983] for supporting research).
However, the multiplicative combination of the constructs was rejected (Rogers, 1983;
Witte & Allen, 2000) even though there has been some evidence of an interaction
between threat probability and response efficacy found in research on smoking secession
(Rogers & Mewborn, 1976) and drinking secession (Kleinot & Rogers, 1982). That
notwithstanding, the rejection of the multiplication rule in favor of the addition processes
led Rogers to revise the PMT by adding more constructs and changing the combinatorial
(Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1983; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997).
In the revised PMT, shown in Figure 6, there are two cognitive mediating
processes that occur when an individual receives a fear appeals message: threat appraisal
and coping appraisal. The threat appraisal evaluation process is the process where the
threat message is evaluated in the context of current behavior. The factors that influence
threat appraisal are rewards from current behavior, perceived severity of the threat, and
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the perceived vulnerability, or the expected probability of occurrence of the threat.
According to the theory, the higher the reward from current behavior, the higher the
chance that an individual will engage in risky behavior and not accept the recommended
action. For threat severity and vulnerability, the higher the threat severity and
vulnerability, the lower the chance that an individual will continue their risky behavior.
Rogers labels the first process as a maladaptive response in an effort to explain the
continuation of risky behavior.
The coping appraisal process involves the appraisal of efficacies for and the costs
of coping behavior. In this process, people evaluate whether or not they can cope with a
threat. The first efficacy component is response efficacy, which is the same as in the
original PMT. Individuals evaluate the recommended response in terms of the
effectiveness of the advocated action in preventing or reducing the threat. The second
efficacy construct in the revised model is based on Bandura’s (1977) self-efficacy theory.
The self-efficacy expectation is the belief that one can successfully perform the task or
response that will solve or reduce the threat at-hand. For both efficacy components, the
higher they are, the higher protection motivation will be. The coping appraisal also
involves evaluations of response cost. If the response cost is too high, it will reduce the
level of protection motivation and prohibit the adoption of the recommended action.
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Figure 6. Schema of the protection motivation process.

Regarding the combination rule governing the influence of the PMT constructs,
the effect of each construct will be combined by an addition process in the new model,
instead of by multiplication (as was the case in the initial version). In the threat appraisal
process, the effect of rewards, threat severity, and vulnerability is combined by addition
(include positive or negative effects) to produce the latent construct of threat evaluation.
The same rule applies to the coping appraisal: the two types of efficacies and response
costs are combined by addition to form a latent construct of coping appraisal. The threat
appraisal and the coping appraisal have direct effects and second-order interaction effects
on protection motivation.
If both the threat appraisal and the coping appraisal are high, the motivation to
protect one’s self should be high. However, when threat is high and coping effectiveness
is low, the motivation to accept the recommendation should also be low, and in many
cases, individuals may even perform more risky behavior in response to the threat. This is
referred to as the “boomerang effect” (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997).
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The revised PMT also changes the way in which protection motivation is
measured. In the original PMT, protection motivation is a separate construct, but in the
revised version, it is suggested that the best way to measure protection motivation is to
measure the intention to perform the recommended action (Rogers, 1982; Rogers &
Prentice-Dunn, 1997). This recommendation makes the protection motivation construct
conceptually similar to the usage intention construct in many other expectancy-based
behavioral models. It is also important to note that in the revised PMT (hereafter referred
to as the PMT2), the emotion of fear is reduced to the role of merely influencing threat
severity and vulnerability evaluations/beliefs; it does not have direct effects on attitude
change or intention.
The schematic of the PMT in Figure 6 suggests that people assess threats by
evaluating threat severity and vulnerability in comparison to the rewards of continuing
current risky behavior. In a separate process, people assess the coping response by
evaluating response efficacy and self-efficacy in contrast with response costs. As the
model suggests, there should be intermediate constructs for threat appraisal and coping
appraisal. However, most PMT research simply combines the effects of all constructs
directly, as shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Correlation model of the revised protection motivation theory.

Protection motivation theory has been used in many behavioral intervention
studies. The majority of such studies are related to health behaviors such as cancer
prevention, exercise/diet/healthy lifestyle, smoking, prevention of the acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), alcohol consumption, and adherence to medical
treatment regimens. This stream of research was designed to help understand the
influence of behavioral intervention by using health threat messages in attempts to
change attitudes. The other major area of research in healthcare is health advertising.
The PMT also has been used in many other areas, such as driving safety,
prevention nuclear warfare, protection of endangered species, and environmental
protection. A list of studies using the PMT can be found in a review by Rogers and
Prentice-Dunn (1997) and in meta-analyses by Floyd et al. (2000) and Milne, Sheersan,
Orbell (2000). Overall, the PMT research has found good support for the specified
constructs of the model, but not all constructs have been found to have the same effect on
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intention across the studies (Floyd et al., 2000; Milne et al., 2000). The meta-analysis by
Milne et al. (2000) found that all factors in the PMT were significantly related to
intention, with cost and self-efficacy being the most influential factors on intention to
adopt the advocated response. Response efficacy had a moderate effect on intention,
while vulnerability to the threat and threat severity had low influence on intention. Floyd
et al. (2000) found similar relationships in their meta-analysis, finding that all factors
were significant and had moderate effects on intention. Self-efficacy was found to have
the largest effect size, followed by response efficacy and a combination of severity and
vulnerability.
There is a limited number of MIS studies that use the PMT as an underlying
theory. The most prominent one is an investigation of home wireless security by Woon,
Tan, and Low (2005). In this survey study, there was no threat manipulation nor were
there recommendations regarding threat-avoidance messages presented to the subjects.
Therefore, all variables were measured based on the perceptions of individual subjects.
The study found that all variables except “perceived vulnerability” were significantly
related to the intention variable; and based on the scale development method presented in
the article, it is safe to assume that all constructs are specified as reflective.
Pahnila, Siponen, and Mahmood (2007) also used the PMT constructs in their
study of security policy compliance. The threat appraisal, coping appraisal, and reward
constructs from the PMT were used in a model that combined the PMT, the TRA, and a
general deterrent theory in one model. For the variables from the PMT, only “threat
appraisal” was found to be significantly related to attitude toward compliance with the
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advocated security policy. In this study (Pahnila et al., 2007), all constructs were assumed
to be reflective constructs as well.
In their comparison of the technology acceptance model (TAM) and the PMT,
Chenoweth, Minch, and Tabor (2007) proposed that the PMT is suitable for use in the
investigation of the adoption of security controls. According to Chenoweth et al., the
TAM is most suitable for explaining user behavior in situations where successful
adoption of security controls will result in benefits, while failure to adopt will have a
neutral result. The PMT, however, is best for situations where adoption will result in
neutral outcomes but where failure to adopt will result in damage. Therefore, they
suggested that for the adoption of security controls, the PMT is a better underlying model
than the TAM.
There has been some criticism of the PMT in the literature. Tanner et al. (1991)
identified four weaknesses of the PMT and proposed the ordered protection motivation
(OPM) model as an improvement to the PMT. First, Tanner et al. (1991) pointed out that
the fear appeal should be included in the model in view of the theoretical notion that low
to moderate levels of fear will increase attention to the threat and recommended action
messages. Second, they believed that the threat appraisal process and response appraisal
process occur in sequential, not parallel, fashion, as suggested in the PMT. Third, they
believed that the PMT assumes that people do not adopt any coping response before
receiving the threat message. Tanner et al. (1991) also suggested that people may
occasionally adopt some kind of coping response in advance of being exposed to threats,
and that this sort of adoption is based on individual experience and knowledge. Finally,
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they suggested that many risk behaviors and protective behaviors may have some social
influences, pointing out that the PMT does not address this contingency.
In an attempt to develop the OPM model as an improved formulation of the PMT,
Tanner et al. (1991) proposed corrections for the weaknesses of the PMT by adding fear,
emotion, and social costs to the model. In addition, they included specific variable
relationships that recognized the ordering of the threat appraisal processes. In their study,
Tanner et al. (1991) found mixed support for the OPM model, and while not all
relationships were found to be significant, most of them were in the direction that the
model suggested. The propositions that were supported in their testing of the OPM model
included the sequential nature of threat appraisal and coping appraisal, the relationship
between knowledge and maladaptive responses, and the positive effects of fear emotion
on attention to the message.
Schoenbachler and Whittler (1996) used the OPM model to study the effect of
social threats to adolescent drug-use behavior. The significant difference between their
model and the OPM model is that they included a social threat as part of the general
threat message instead of specifying social cost as a separate construct. The results of
their study show that social threat has a stronger persuasion effect than physical threat.
Witte and colleagues (Witte, 1992a; Witte 1998; Witte & Allen, 2000) shared the
same view as Tanner et al. (1991). They suggested that the two general evaluative
processes in the PMT do not happen at the same time and that people evaluate threats
before they evaluate the protective response to the threat. In addition, they suggested that
fear emotions occur when people believe that the damage from a threat is severe and that
they are vulnerable to the threat. Fear then drives people to evaluate the recommended
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action or to consider alternative maladaptive responses. In summary, Witte and
colleagues proposed that the PMT can explain only half of the phenomena of perceivers’
responses to fear-inducing messages.
Witte and others also proposed an extended parallel process model (EPPM)
(Witte, 1992a; Witte 1998; Witte & Allen, 2000) as a framework in which the PMT
operates and which explains acceptance of the recommended threat-reducing action as
one part of a general danger control process. Another important process in EPPM is fear
control; when fear is high and the efficacy of the response is low, then people will try to
reduce fear by engaging in a maladaptive response in order to reduce their fear.
Limitations of the Protection Motivation Theory
A first weakness of the PMT lies in the definition of adaptive and maladaptive
coping responses. Adaptive responses are behaviors in response to fear-inducing threats;
they help people function well in the face of fearful threats, although they may not solve
the fear-inducing problem. Adaptive responses, however, reduce the impact of threats by
reducing either the severity of the threat or the vulnerability to the threat. Behavior that
does not serve to reduce the severity or vulnerability of the threat can be considered
maladaptive. In the PMT research, the recommended protection behavior is usually
regarded as the only adaptive response.
Low intention to perform the advocated threat-reducing behavior on the part of
perceivers is generally an indicator of a higher chance that they will engage in
maladaptive response behavior. While this assumption is true in some health protective
behaviors, it may not be true in other general protective behaviors. In the case of
phishing, for example, adaptive responses could include a range of beneficial behaviors,
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including learning to identify phishing or using antiphishing software. However, some
putative adaptive behaviors engaged in by individuals might be based on faulty beliefs
and result in harmful outcomes. The evaluation of these faulty adaptive responses,
ineffectual though they may ultimately be, should be the same as real adaptive responses
(i.e., based on cognitive processes rather than emotional processes).
In addition, it is possible that some people may already be engaging in protective
measures at the same time in which they receive information about a threat, which will
result in the person perceiving the threat with less concern than someone who is not
already aware and taking protective action. This notion of prior threat response reducing
the effectiveness of protection-focused communications is mentioned by Tanner et al.
(1991), though their theoretical context in that regard is focused on a priori engagement
in maladaptive practices rather than adaptive protective steps. Hence, the consideration of
current protective behavior in models of protection motivation may help explain why
people do not always act affirmatively on the advice of protective communications.
Another weakness of the PMT is the omission of interactions among constructs in
the current version of the model. In the original version (see Figure 5), effects of
appraised severity, expectancy of exposure, and efficacy of coping responses are
combined in multiplicative fashion. Hence, owing to this particular consideration, the
absence of any one of the key variables results in a mathematical calculation of no
protection motivation. For example, if people believe that a threat can cause serious
damage but that there is also no chance that it will happen to them, no matter how
effective a suggested protection is, they will not have any motivation to adopt it. The
same pertains for other components of the model: if the damage of the threat is low or
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nonexistent, there is no perceived need to take protective steps, no matter how
compelling the argument may be to do so, and also, if the recommended protection is
perceived to be ineffective, people will not adopt it. In this measure, the multiplicative
rule is meant to capture the negating effect of any one model component having little or
no impact on the protective recommendation.
Weinstein (2000) noted several reasons in support of eschewing the multiplicative
rule. First, it is possible that the ranges of variation in the PMT constructs are too limited
to demonstrate the interactions. Second, the measurement error of the multiplicative
model will be higher, which makes the correlation in the multiplicative model difficult to
detect. Finally, the multiplicative rule may still operate but not give appreciable returns
when the value of each of the constructs is close to but not completely at zero. Also, at
the range of response in which PMT research is normally conducted, the relationship may
manifest in some other function than simple multiplication.
In this experiment, Weinstein (2000) found strong evidence of an interaction
between perceived severity and perceived likelihood by varying both variables in a larger
range than in other PMT research. The function of perceived severity and perceived
likelihood in influencing intention is a simple multiplication of both variables up to the
likelihood of 50% probability of occurrence. After 50%, the relation takes a more
complex form. Witte and colleague (Witte, 1992a; Witte 1998; Witte & Allen, 2000) also
suggested that the combination rule should be multiplicative based on logical reasoning.
There is another possible reason for low correlations in the multiplicative model:
perhaps the measurement scale of the PMT constructs is mis-specified. The ideal
measurement scale for a multiplicative model would be ratio, with no arbitrary zero point
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(Jaccard & Wan, 1990). However, most of the measurement scales employed in social
psychology and the behavioral science are at the ordinal level of measurement.
The third limitation of the PMT, which was acknowledged by Rogers (1975)
when he first formulated the theory, is that the model includes only the cognitive
processes involved in threat evaluation and responses, while ignoring the influence of
message acceptance and the persuasive process. The inclusion of a persuasion factor in
the process may help explain why people reject the threat and subsequent
recommendation, when all other logic would suggest they would accede to the request to
take protective steps. As part of considering the impact of persuasion in the model, one of
the factors to consider is the current belief held by the perceiver. Current belief plays an
important role in attitude change by persuasion. If the persuasive message contains belief
statements that differ too much from the perceiver’s current belief, there is a high chance
that the message will be rejected (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). If the persuasive message is
very close to current belief, people will accept it, but there may be little contrast between
advocated positions and current beliefs, which may result in little change in current
beliefs and attitudes. Effective persuasion messages should not be too far away from
current beliefs, though they should be different enough to form the basis for some shift in
beliefs or attitudes. This persuasion factor may partially explain why some studies found
that people who received high threat messages still rejected the recommended protective
action.
The omission of the order of cognitive processing is also a weakness of the PMT.
As Tanner et al. (1991) point out, people are more likely to process presented information
and the outcome of the appraisal process sequentially rather simultaneously. In the OPM
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model, the result of threat evaluation acts as a trigger for a response evaluation process,
and one must come before the other. Therefore, threat evaluations must take place before
response evaluations can be made. In the EPPM (Witte, 1992a; Witte 1998; Witte &
Allen, 2000), sequential evaluation processes are also proposed. However, fear, which
results from threat evaluation, is a trigger of response evaluation. In this study, the
sequential order of processes suggested in the OPM model will be utilized.
The final weakness of the PMT is that it reduces the role of the emotion of fear to
a byproduct of threat evaluation. The OPM model (Tanner et al., 1991) represented fear
as a factor that influences attention to the recommended message. Witte (1992b) reported
a negative effect for fear appeals, indicating that it caused people to feel as if they were
being intentionally manipulated by the message. In the EPPM model (Witte, 1992a; Witte
1998; Witte & Allen, 2000), fear is also a major construct that influences maladaptive
coping responses. In this sense, for risky computer-use behaviors, the threat message that
creates fear may not be appropriate, as it may have negative effects on acceptance of the
advocated protective measure.
The Theory of Planned Behavior
Attitude and personality are two major concepts that social psychologists use to
predict behavior. Both of them are defined broadly as predispositions to behave. The
main difference between attitude and personality is that attitude is based on learning
arising from evaluations of the attitude object, while personality is based on individual
differences between perceivers. Therefore, according to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975),
attitude has more utility for the social scientist than personality does because attitude is
relatively easier to change than personality, which is a stable trait. The theory of reasoned
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action (TRA), which is a basis of the theory of planned behavior (TPB), holds the
relationship between attitude and behavior as a central proposition. Attitude influences
behavior through the mediation of behavioral intention, as shown in Figure 8. In the
TRA, attitude is defined as “a learned predisposition to respond in a consistently
favorable or unfavorable manner with respect to a given object” (Fishbein & Ajzen,
1975, p. 10). Extending from this definition, Ajzen (1988) recommended that attitude
should be measured by the amount of positive or negative affect toward an object, such as
bipolar affective evaluation and semantic difference.

Figure 8. Relationship betweem attitude, intention, and behavior.

The TRA also recognizes that because of social factors, people cannot always
behave the way they want. Behavior is also influenced by social norms through the
mediation of intention. This formulation, including attitudes and norms, is shown in
Figure 9.

Figure 9. The theory of reasoned action (TRA).
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The combined influence of attitude and subjective norm alone is not enough to
explain the basis of behavior. The underlying beliefs that form the attitude and subjective
norm are important concepts as well. According to the TRA, attitude is formed by the
combined effects of behavioral beliefs. Behavioral beliefs are defined as beliefs about the
outcomes of the behavior and the likelihood that the outcome will occur. In the same
way, subjective norm is formed by the combined effect of normative beliefs, which are
beliefs about expectations of others and the likelihood of compliance with expectations.

Behavioral Beliefs

Attitude toward
Behavior

Normative Beliefs

Subjective Norm

Control Beliefs

Perceived
Behavioral
Control

Behavioral
Intention

Behavior

Figure 10. The theory of planned behavior (TPB).

Considering the influence of the self-efficacy concept (Bandura, 1977), Ajzen
(1988) added a third component to the TRA to create the TPB (Figure 10). Perceived
behavioral control, which is closely related to self-efficacy, is the concept that reflects the
perceptions of people as to their degree of control over their own actions, owing to
aspects of the situation and to their own capabilities. The control beliefs, or beliefs about
factors that may prevent performance, and the perceived power of such beliefs influence
perceived behavioral control. Actual behavioral control also influences behavior, but
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since it is difficult to measure, perceived behavioral control is used as an estimation of
actual control capabilities.
The TPB and the PMT share the same underlying theoretical base: both are based
on the relationship between attitude and behavior. In the PMT, attitude is not formally
included in the model, but the goals of persuasion, from which the PMT was derived, are
aimed at changing beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behavior. In the review of healthprotective models, Weinstein (1993) found that every concept in PMT has an analogous
construct in the TPB. For example, the risk concept in the PMT is comparable to the role
of beliefs in the TPB, each of which are defined in the form of expectancy-value. Belief
is the way people associate an attribute with an object. In the TPB, belief has two
components: the belief strength and outcome evaluation. Belief strength is the belief
about the probability that the outcome will occur, which is closely related to perceived
vulnerability to the threat in the PMT formulations. The outcome evaluation is the
perceived importance of the outcome, which is related to perceived threat severity in the
PMT.
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CHAPTER 3:
RESEARCH MODEL DEVELOPMENT
The review of the literature indicates that knowledge, design factors, and
demographics are the determining factors in phishing response behaviors. The knowledge
about phishing threats may help increase threat perceptions, while design factors are
closely related to self-efficacy and cost in the PMT model. As compared with other
behavioral models, the PMT is a suitable model to study risk behaviors and protection
behaviors, as pointed out by Chenoweth et al. (2007). While it has been widely accepted
as a theory for protection behaviors, the PMT still has some limitations that need to be
addressed. In this chapter, improvements to the PMT for purposes of testing will be
proposed.
Proposed Research Model
Despite limitations of the PMT, this model does aid the understanding of why
people accept the recommendation to protect themselves, especially when seeking policy
solutions for the prevention of risky computer-use behavior, such as responding to
phishing attempts. Based on the PMT, changes in one construct in the model will
subsequently change the intention to perform the recommended behavior. When studied
in an empirical context, this can indicate the relative importance of each construct for
influencing a particular behavior sufficiently to guide in the development of an
intervention strategy. Prior research on phishing behavior, based on models other than
protection motivation, still suggests a similar set of independent variables, similar to what
is seen in the PMT. However, many of these other models do not offer direct recipes on
how to manage the variables needed to influence phishing response behavior.
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The model in Figure 11 adds several new insights to the PMT structure. First,
threat severity and vulnerability to the threat are redefined as components of the threat
belief, in-line with planned behavior models. Threat severity is the level of damage that
could occur if the threat manifested itself, and vulnerability to the threat is the perceived
probability that the threat will actually occur.

Figure 11. Proposed research model.

Following the expectancy model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 222), threat severity
and vulnerability to the threat are combined by the multiplication rule to form a threat
belief (as noted in Figure 12). The salient threat beliefs are then combined by the additive
rule to form the threat evaluation, which is the overall assessment of the threat.
Therefore, the relationship between severity, vulnerability, threat beliefs, and threat
evaluation can be summarized in following multi-attribute equation:
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∑ (Si ×Vi) Æ TE
Where:
Si = Severity of belief i
Vi = Vulnerability belief i
(Si ×Vi) = Threat belief i
TE = Threat evaluation

Figure 12. Threat belief model.

There are several implications to this threat belief model: (1) This model
recognizes that people can have multiple and unrelated threat beliefs about a single
behavior. Phishing can pose multiple threats to users, such as identity theft and threats
from malicious software. (2) This model follows the well-defined belief-attitude structure
of the TRA, which enables direct comparisons between constructs using the scale
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development process of the TRA. And (3) according to persuasion research, attitude,
which influences behavior through intention, can be altered by changing existing beliefs
and/or adding new beliefs. This model will permit the study of the specific effects of a
belief being modified in the study.
Secondly, a perceived problem is added to the model to recognize the potential
role of current protective behavior and the evaluative sequence of threat evaluations and
response evaluations. The perceived problem is influenced by the threat evaluation and
perceived effectiveness of the current behavior. This step is taken because it is possible
that people already perform some protective behaviors before they learn of ways to
counter threats. Current actions may be perceived to be effective against the new threat,
which reduces or eliminates the need to adopt the advocated new protection. Therefore,
the perceived problem is a necessary condition for the initiation of a response evaluation.
In other words, the perceived problem drives the need for a new protection evaluation
and triggers the response evaluation process. If people do not perceive a problem, they
will not evaluate the recommended action, or they will evaluate it with less attention.
However, in an experimental setting where subjects are forced to evaluate the
recommend behavior, this condition may not occur. The perceived problem construct is
closely related to cognitive dissonance (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Festinger, 1957),
referring to the perceived gap between the current situation and a more desirable
situation. The example is the perceived gap between current protective behavior and the
level of protection a person desires. Cognitive dissonance occurs when behavior and
attitude are not in alignment. In risky behavior cases, dissonance happens when a person
not only performs a risky behavior but also has a belief or attitude that he or she should
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not perform risky behavior because of possible threats.
For phishing response behavior, subjects may already use some form of protection
that they believe protects them from the threat. Examples of possible protections are to
only respond to e-mails from known senders, to use virus protection software, and to be
able to identify spoof website addresses/URLs. It should be noted that these protections
may or may not actually reduce threat. If subjects believe that they can help reduce the
threat, they may think that the problem is less serious than it actually is.
Third, threat evaluation is proposed to influence perceived effectiveness of the
recommended action. When people evaluate the effectiveness of a protective action, they
should evaluate it against the threat. In prior PMT studies, effectiveness of the
recommended action was presumed to already be evaluated against the threat. However,
the PMT model does not explicitly state this relationship. The explicit inclusion of the
relationship between threat evaluation and response efficacy can be useful when the
recommended behavior is potentially not fully effective. For example, not responding to
suspicious e-mails can be highly effective against phishing threats. However, if people
perceived that they had already responded to e-mails in the past, stopping now may be
perceived to be only partially effective against the threat.
Fourth, rewards from risk behavior are proposed to be part of the cost of the
recommended protection and to be evaluated in the response evaluation process. Phishing
uses the mechanism of attractive inducements to simulate responses. Subjects, in
avoiding a phishing attempt, can also perceive the potential loss of the inducement
offered. The reason for this proposed change to the PMT is that people probably think
about giving up the rewards offered as inducements by phishing when they think about
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changing behavior, not when they realize that their behavior can actually cause a
problem. Therefore, the rewards are re-conceptualized as opportunity costs, which are
part of the cost of the recommended protection. In avoiding phishing responses, users
have to give up the possibility to getting a good deal on a product or service that they
perceive that they might obtain by responding to the message. However, they do not have
to give up these rewards, if they learn to differentiate phishing e-mails from legitimate
promotional e-mails.
Finally, threat evaluation, perceived effectiveness, perceived self-efficacy, and
costs are proposed to be combined with a complex noncontinuous rule, which depends on
the value of each variable. While the theoretical combination rule is unknown, it can be
approximated with an additive rule that uses interactions among dependent variables. The
interactions are proposed to be three-way interactions of threat evaluation, perceived
effectiveness, and perceived self-efficacy.
The interactions among dependent variables offer new insight into phishing
response behavior. The interaction model suggests that we should balance threat and
response efficacies (effectiveness and self-efficacy) while keeping the opportunity costs
and direct costs low in efforts to convince people to change their behavior. Simply
increasing the threat may not work, as we have observed in the phishing context.
The improved PMT model can be summarized in the following propositions:
Proposition 1: Threat beliefs influence threat evaluations.
Proposition 2: Threat evaluations positively influence cognitive dissonance.
Proposition 3: Effectiveness of current behavior negatively influences cognitive
dissonance.
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Proposition 4: Threat evaluations positively influence intentions to perform
recommended protective behaviors.
Proposition 5: Cognitive dissonance positively influences intentions to perform
recommended protective behaviors.
Proposition 6: Cognitive dissonance is a necessary condition to start the response
evaluation process.
Proposition 7: Perceived effectiveness of the recommended protective behavior
positively influences intentions to perform the recommended protective behavior.
Proposition 8: Perceived self-efficacy to perform the recommended protective
behavior positively influences intentions to perform the recommended protective
behavior.
Proposition 9: Perceived costs of the recommended protective behavior
negatively influence intentions to perform the recommended protective behavior.
Proposition 10: Intention to perform the recommended protective behavior
positively influences performance of the recommended protective behavior.
Persuasion Factors
Rogers (1975) provided a limited discussion of the persuasion process that takes
place prior to the protection motivation process. He decided to not include any of the
persuasion variables in the PMT because he wanted to include only cognitive processes
in the model. The proposed model follows the PMT by including only the cognitive
portion. However, the persuasion process is important and may have an impact on the
cognitive process. Therefore, the persuasion process will be discussed to understand its
impact on the PMT.
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According to persuasion research (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Hovland et al., 1953),
in order to form a new belief after being exposed to a persuasion message, individuals
must (1) attend to the message, (2) be able to comprehend the message, and (3) accept the
message (see Figure 13). Message characteristics, source characteristics, and individual
differences have been shown to affect message acceptance processes. In addition, the
interaction of source credibility and the difference between existing beliefs and belief
statements in the persuasion message also affect message acceptance. The more
difference there is between the persuasive message and the existing belief, the less likely
it is that an individual will accept the message. High source credibility can improve the
chance that an individual will accept the message, but the effect of source credibility is
thought to be nonlinear (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 465). After an individual accepts a
new message, the new belief is formed by combining the persuasion message with the
existing belief. At this point, the greater the difference between the persuasion message
and existing beliefs, the larger the perceived differences between the newly formed belief
and the existing belief.

Figure 13. Message acceptance internal mediating process.
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In order to persuade subjects that the threats from phishing are real and that
damage could be severe, the threat message should not differ too much from subjects’
existing beliefs in order to make it acceptable, while it should be different enough to
change their beliefs. In this instance, source credibility can improve or reduce the chance
that students will accept the threat message.
Actual Behavior
The PMT model and other behavioral models posit that actual behavior is
influenced by intentions to perform behaviors. However, intention is not the only
determinant of behavior. For behaviors over which the individual does not have complete
control, perceived behavioral control also influences the actual behavior (see Figure 10 in
Chapter 2). Behavioral control is defined by Ajzen (1988) as the degree of control that an
individual has over the resources and situations that affect the performance of the actual
behavior. In many cases, the individual may have the intention to control the behavior but
cannot do so because of the lack of time and resources or a subsequent change of
intentions.
For purposes of comparison, the comprehensive protection motivation model,
which includes persuasion factors and behavioral control, is shown in Figure 14. The
research designed to test the proposed PMT model, explained in the next chapter, will
consider the factors included in this model. However, only the model proposed for testing
in Figure 11 forms the basis for the current study.
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Figure 14. Comprehensive model of protection motivation.
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Intention to Perform Risk Behavior
The intention to perform risk behavior is not simply an inverse of the intention to
perform recommended behavior. Most of the concepts in the risk behavior model shown
in Figure 15 are the same as the threat evaluations of the protection motivation model
shown in Figure 11. However, while the directions are the same, the dependent variables
in the risk behavior model have an inverse influence compared to the protective behavior
model. Perceived rewards from engaging in risky behavior is an additional construct that
may influence propensity to engage in risky behavior. The rewards from risky behavior
include intrinsic rewards and extrinsic rewards, as well as social-related rewards.

Threat Beliefs

Perceived Efficacy
of
Current Coping
+

Threat Severity
X
Vulnerability to
Threat

Perceived Threat

-

Intention to Perform
Risk Behavior

Risk Behavior

Rewards from Risk
Behavior

Figure 15. Risk behavior model.

The risk behavior model can be summarized in the following propositions:
Proposition 11: Effectiveness of current behavior positively influences intentions
to perform risky behaviors.
Proposition 12: Threat evaluations negatively influence intentions to perform
risky behaviors.
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Proposition 13: Rewards from risky behavior positively influence intentions to
perform risky behaviors.
Proposition 14: Intentions to perform risky behavior positively influence
performance of risky behaviors.
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CHAPTER 4:
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Most of the prior fear appeals research has used an experimental design in its
methodology. The early goal of fear appeals research was to find an optimized level of
fear that would effectively change individual behavior. Therefore, experimental designs
that randomly exposed subjects to various types of threat messages were used to attain
this research objective. The PMT research, which extended from fear appeals research,
continues to utilize this research procedure (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997) despite the
main shift in focus to an overall behavior model that involved multiple constructs.
Rotfeld (1988) recommended that fear appeals research should shift its goal from
finding an optimal fear level or the inflection point of an inverted U shape to a behavior
model. In doing so, Rotfeld also proposed changes in research procedures to reflect the
new goal. As the main goal of this study is to test an overall behavioral model, it is
appropriate to follow the recommendations by Rotfeld (1988), which were later adopted
by Roser and Thompson (1995) and LaTour and Rotfeld (1997).
Research Design
Rotfeld (1988) recommended that fear appeals research should present a single
threat message to all subjects instead of varying the threat message for each group of
subjects. By doing this, researchers could measure attitude, behavior, and other variables
based on individual subject responses to a single threat communication. This would help
to eliminate an assumption about level of threat or fear by direct measures based on
individual perceptions of the message. Therefore, in this study, threat messages will be
used not as manipulation but rather as stimuli.
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The research procedure consists of multiple steps. The first step was to generate
modal salient threat beliefs from the literature. Second, multiple threat messages were
reviewed by a focus group. Third, the selected threat message was tested to make sure
that it had an effect on belief and/or threat evaluation. Forth, the main data was collected.
Finally, data analysis and testing of the research model were performed. The outline of
each step will be presented next.
Salient Threat Beliefs
Ajzen (2002b) recommended that both modal salient beliefs (which are based on
theory) and actual beliefs (which were elicited from pretesting) can be used in the beliefattitude model. In this study, threat belief structures were generated by using modal
beliefs from the literature. Both trade journals and academic journals were used to list
possible threats arising from phishing e-mails. The list of the salient threat beliefs in the
study is shown in Table 2.

Table 2
Salient Threat Beliefs
Threat
Victim of identity theft
Direct loss from scam
Computer virus and
other malware infection

References
Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor (2006); Dodge, Carver, &
Ferguson (2007); McCall (2007); FTC (2009)
Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor (2006); Kruck & Kruck (2006);
Egelman, Cranor, & Hong (2008)
Aytes & Conolly (2003); Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor
(2006); Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu (2009)
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Threat Message
The threat message in this study was presented to every subject in the same
manner. However, it was still necessary to test the message to make sure the stimuli had
the intended effect on the individuals subjected to it. Initial threat messages were
designed according to the persuasion theory (Olson & Zanna, 1993; Petty, Wegener, &
Fabrigar, 1997) and were designed to have clear belief statements and refer to highly
credible sources (i.e., Chief Information Officer of the University and the Federal Trade
Commission). While pretesting, two sets of threat messages were presented to a focus
group comprised of students from upper-division information technology classes. The
first threat message provided specific examples of phishing e-mails along with the
targeted threat message, while the second treatment set included only the targeted threat
message without specific examples. The focus group indicated that inclusion of phishing
examples along with the threat message actually reduced the threat perception as
compared to the threat message alone. This may be due to pre-existing subject knowledge
of the phishing example coupled with the group members’ belief that they would not be
fooled by such phishing attempts. This would then reduce their overall threat evaluations
and cause them to discount the effect of the threat message.
Stimuli Check
The proposed threat message was tested further to assess the effect of the threat
message and whether it could influence threat evaluations or not. A sample of 31 students
was used to test the effect of the threat message. The results of ANOVA testing
demonstrate that phishing threat evaluations were significantly different (p = .026)
between the group that read the message and the group that did not. However, the threat
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message did not have a significant effect on threat beliefs. The result of the ANOVA test
is summarized in Table 3.

Table 3
ANOVA Test of Threat Response
Mean of
nonthreat group

Mean of
threat group

p

Threat evaluation

3.82

4.75

0.026

Direct financial loss

2.19

3.05

0.131

Identity theft

2.51

3.03

0.395

Virus and malware

2.97

3.36

0.531

Variable

While the threat message did not have a significant effect on each threat belief,
the mean of each belief for the threat group was consistently higher than the nonthreat
group. The combined effect of each belief was enough to make the overall threat
evaluation significantly different. In summary, the combined effect of the threat stimulus
was sufficient to change overall threat evaluation.
Main Study
In the main study, while a single threat message was used for all survey
participants, the respondents were randomly exposed to three different solution
recommendations to potentially ameliorate the threat. The three recommended actions
were (1) learning to identify phishing messages and web sites, (2) using new web
browsers and e-mail clients that have antiphishing features, and (3) using and maintaining
antivirus and antispyware applications. The variables in the model were assessed by a pen
and paper questionnaire.
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Population and Sample
The population in testing for the study refers to the entire group of internet users
who could be affected by phishing. It is reasonable to assume that the entire population of
internet-based e-mail users could constitute the generalizable population of this study. As
the percentage of spam and phishing e-mails account for about 85% of total messages
received by most internet users (Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group, 2009), every
e-mail user should have encountered at least one phishing attempt during the past year.
However, the procedure of this study makes it difficult to survey the general internet
population. As a result, a sample of university students was used as a representative
sample for the study. This sample frame could be regarded as a limitation of this study,
although alternative samples that use the actual internet population would result in a loss
of control in how the subjects read and respond to the questionnaire, thus denigrating the
precision of the execution. In addition, debriefing is challenging in field settings.
Measurement
Perceived effectiveness of coping response, perceived self-efficacy, and intention
to perform recommended protective behaviors in the proposed model are defined in the
same way as defined in the original PMT model. Therefore, these three constructs were
measured by using minor modified versions of the well-established scales that have been
used in prior PMT and fear appeal research. Threat belief, threat evaluation, perceived
problem, and perceived cost are defined slightly differently from in the way they were
defined in the original PMT. New measurement scales were developed for these
constructs. However, there are comparable or closely related concepts for these
constructs found in other behavioral models that can be used as guidelines for these new
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scales. Finally, perceived effectiveness of current behavior, which is a new construct in
the model, can be measured in the same way as perceived effectiveness of coping
response, which eliminates the need to create a new scale for it.
Threat Evaluation
Threat evaluation is a new construct that is introduced in the proposed model.
Previously in the PMT, the threat is evaluated in two separated constructs—severity and
vulnerability (or susceptibility). In some fear appeals models, such as EPPM (Witte,
1992a; Witte, 1998; Witte & Allen, 2000), perceived threat is a second-level construct
that is measured by combined severity and susceptibility (Witte, Cameron, McKeon, &
Berkowitz, 1996). However, by doing so, perceived threat is measured by belief-based
scales, which do not reflect the evaluative nature of the proposed construct.
Threat evaluation refers to personal evaluation of the threat that may result from
risky behaviors at an unfavorable level. The threat evaluation concept is closely related to
attitude toward the threat and can be defined the same way. However, it should be noted
that threat evaluation or attitude toward the threat are not the same as attitude in the TRA
and TPB models, where attitude is actually operationalized as attitude toward behavior.
Because it closely related to attitude, threat evaluation is proposed to be measured
the same way that attitude is measured. Ajzen (2002a) recommended using semantic
differential scales to measure attitude. In semantic differential scales, a pair of bipolar
adjectives that reflect favorable and unfavorable beliefs are placed at the end of each
scale that the subject evaluates attitude objects with. With regard to the threat, it is safe to
assume that there is no favorable affect toward a threat. So, the threat evaluation scales
are proposed to be unipolar, 7-point scales with adjective pairs that reflect zero or no
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threat at one end and negative affect at the other end (see Table 4). These semantic pairs
are from Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957), as recommended by Fishbein and Ajzen
(1975, p. 73).

Table 4
Threat Evaluation Scales
Zero affection end

Negative affection end

Safe

Danger

Riskless

Risky

Nonthreatening

Threatening

Harmless

Noxious

Threat Belief
While threat evaluation is defined in terms of affect evaluation, belief is defined
in a more complex construct. Belief associates objects or events with attributes of the
belief target (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). In the TRA and the TPB, behavioral belief has
two components—outcome evaluation and belief strength. Outcome evaluation refers to
an important level or an impact level of the outcome of a behavior. Outcome evaluation is
measured by 5- to 11-point scales that anchor with negative impact and positive impact
on each end. Belief strength refers to a perceived level of certainty that an outcome
associated with a behavior will actually happen. Belief strength is measured by 5- to 11point scales that anchor with level of certainty such as unlikely to likely.
Following the behavioral belief concept, threat belief refers to salient beliefs
about impact of a possible threat and the chance that a threat will actually arise. From this
definition, threat belief consist of two components—severity (or level of impact) and
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vulnerability (or a chance). Severity is closely related to outcome evaluation in that both
refer to a perceived level of impact from a behavioral outcome or from a threat.
Vulnerability is also closely related to belief strength in that both refer to the perceived
probability that an outcome or a threat will actually occur. As threat belief is closely
related to behavioral belief, development of measurement scales for its subcomponents
will follow the well-established guideline of the TPB (see Ajzen [2002b] for more details
on a procedure).
Severity was measured by 7-point scales ranging from 1 to 7, which reflect “no
impact” at 0 (negligible) and “very high impact” at 6 (serious). Vulnerability was
measured by 7-point scales ranging from 1 to 7 with “unlikely” and “likely” end anchors.
Then, threat belief was computed from the product of severity and vulnerability.
Perceived Self-Efficacy
Self-efficacy is both well-known and widely used in behavioral research. In this
study, perceived self-efficacy was measured by an adapted version of the self-efficacy
scales from Witte et al. (1996). These self-efficacy scales have 3 items with keywords
“able,” “easy,” and “can.”
Effectiveness of Current Behavior and Effectiveness of Recommended Protective Action
In typical PMT research, the threat from risky behavior is assumed to be only one
threat or assumed to be highly correlated if there are multiple threats. Therefore, it is
evident that severity, vulnerability, and effectiveness of recommended behavior are
measured by reflective indicators. However, in this study, the threats from phishing are
proposed to be multiple and unrelated (i.e., direct loss, malware, and identity theft). In
addition, the protective action may be effective against one threat and not against another
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threat. Moreover, the protective action may reduce only severity, vulnerability, or both.
Therefore, newly developed scales were needed to measure the effectiveness of
protective actions to assess these assumptions. Questions were used that asked subjects to
rate the effectiveness of a protective behavior against each threat by comparing it to the
average e-mail user to measure effectiveness of the behavior.
Perceived Cost
In the latest version of Rogers’ PMT model (Rogers, 1983), perceived cost and
perceived reward are two separate constructs. However, large numbers of PMT
researchers combine cost and reward into one perceived cost construct. The focus group
suggested that the reward can be a very important factor for some risky behaviors. In this
study, reward is redefined as an opportunity cost that the subject has to give up if he or
she avoids the risky behavior. The rationale is that only the reward that he or she has to
give up should affect the behavior. The second cost component is a direct cost of
protection such as cost of protective software, time, and effort required. Perceived direct
cost and perceived opportunity cost were measured with 3-item Likert scales that reflect
direct and opportunity costs of recommended protective behaviors.
Cognitive Dissonance
Cognitive dissonance is another well-known and widely used concept in attitude
and behavioral research. However, there have only been a few attempts to develop
measurement scales for it (Elliot & Devine, 1994). In many dissonance studies,
dissonance is assumed to occur by manipulation and is generally not measured. There is
also a cognitive dissonance scale in marketing research (e.g., Sweeney, Hausknecht, and
Soutar, 2000); however, the scales are not useful for protection motivation research
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because they focus on the dissonance that happens after purchase. In this study, the
cognitive dissonance scale adapted from Elliot and Devine (1994) was used. The scales
have 3-item Likert scales with the keywords “uneasy,” “bother,” and “uncomfortable.”
Intention to Perform Recommended Behavior
Intention is one of the most widely known and studied constructs in behavioral
research, aside from attitude. Intention to perform the recommended protective behavior
was measured by scales developed to follow Ajzen’s (2002b) recommendation for
developing planned behavior scales. The scales have 3-item Likert measures with the
keywords “intend,” “plan,” and “try.”
Common Method Variance Bias
There is concern over the possibility of common method bias, which is a risk in
attitude-behavioral research (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Therefore,
the questionnaire and the items in the questionnaire were designed with accordance to the
recommendations of Podsakoff et al. (2003). For example, dependent variables and
independent variables are temporally separated in the questionnaire. Most variable are
measured by different scales or with different anchors if the scales are the same. In
addition, a selected marker variable that should not be correlated with any of the
variables in the model was also included to check for common method bias (Podsakoff et
al., 2003; Malhotra, Kim, & Patil, 2006). Satisfaction with one’s internet service provider
(ISP) was chosen as a marker variable because it has the same theme as the study, though
it should not correlate with any variables in the model. The measurement of ISP
satisfaction is an adapted version of Carr’s (2007) satisfaction scales.
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A summary of all measurements in the study, along with the definition and the
bibliographic references for the associated scales, is shown in Table 5.
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Table 5
Summary of Measurement Scales
Construct
Definition
Perceived
Belief about the chance that a threat
vulnerability to the will be realized
threat
Perceived severity
Belief about impact from threat if a
of the threat
threat is realized
Threat belief
Expected impact from a threat
Threat evaluation

Personal affective evaluation of the
threat that may happen from risk;
attitude toward threat

Perceived
effectiveness of
current action
Cognitive
dissonance

Belief about relative level of severity
and/or vulnerability that reduces by
perform current behavior
Cognitive unbalance of the perceived
situation and desire situation.
Cognitive dissonance
Perceived
Belief about relative level of severity
and/or vulnerability that reduces by
effectiveness of
recommended action perform recommended action
Perceived selfBelief that one can successfully
efficacy
perform the recommended action
Perceived costs

Cost of recommended behavior and
opportunity cost of stopping current
behavior
Intention to perform Belief about a possibility to perform
recommended action recommended action.

Measurement
7-point scales (1 to 7) anchored with “unlikely
“ and “likely”

Reference
Ajzen (2002a),
Weinstein (2000)

7-point scales (1 to 7) anchored with
“negligible” and “serious”
Perceived vulnerability × perceived severity

Ajzen (2002a),
Weinstein (2000)
Fishbien & Ajzen
(1975), Ajzen (2002a)
Ajzen & Fishbein
(1975), Ajzen (2002a),
Osgood, Suci, &
Tannenbaum (1957)

4 items, 7-point semantic differential scales (1
to 7)
7-point scales (1 to 7) anchored with
“significantly lower” and “significantly higher”
3 items, cognitive dissonance, 7-point Likert
scales anchored with “never” and “always”

Elliot & Devine (1994)

7-point scales (1 to 7) anchored with
“significantly lower” and “significantly higher”
3 items, self-efficacy, 7-point Likart scales
anchored with “strongly disagree” and
“strongly agree”
3 items, 7-point Likert Scales anchored with
“not at all” and “to a great extent”

Witte, Cameron,
McKeon, & Berkowitz
(1996)

3 items, intention, 7-point Likert scales
anchored with “probably not” and “definitely”

Ajzen (2002a)
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Measurement Scale Pretest
All the measurement scales were pretested in a file-sharing experiment. While
file-sharing behaviors and phishing response behavior are slightly different, both of them
are risky computer security behaviors that could cause serious harm to both individuals
and information systems. In addition, the scales used for both purposes are identical
except for contextual wording changes. Because of their similarity, the scales that were
successfully validated in the file-sharing context should also be valid for use in phishing
contexts.
The reliabilities of reflective indicators based on Cronbach’s α in Table 6 show
good internal consistency for the group of measures. The cost variable is proposed to be
formative but was included here for comparison purposes. The results of factor analysis
of the reflective indicators also show the items loading on the appropriate construct,
demonstrating decent convergent validity (see Table 7).

Table 6
Reliabilities of the Measurements (Pretest)
Variable
Cronbach's α

No. of items

Cognitive dissonance

0.787

3

Threat evaluation

0.901

4

Current effectiveness

0.920

6

Recommended effectiveness

0.913

6

Perceived self-efficacy

0.835

3

Perceived cost

0.776

3

Behavioral intention

0.946

3

Satisfaction (marker)

0.925

4
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Table 7
Factor Loading (Pretest)
Item

1

Current effectiveness severity legal

.938

Current effectiveness vulnerability disciplinary

.835

Current effectiveness vulnerability legal

.802

Current effectiveness severity disciplinary

.764

Current effectiveness vulnerability virus

.628

Current effectiveness severity virus

.598

2

6

.879

Recommended effectiveness severity disciplinary

.747

Recommended effectiveness severity legal

.728

8

.764

.363

Recommended effectiveness severity virus

-.321

.707
.643

.348

Marker 03

.938

Marker 02

.883

Marker 01

.865

Marker 04

.788

Threat evaluation (danger)

.820

Threat evaluation (risky)

.810

Threat evaluation (threaten)

-.317

.790

Threat evaluation (noxious)

-.379

.577

.309

Intention (plan)

.903

Intention (try)

.888

Intention (inten)

.753

Dissonance (uneasy)

.335

.794

Dissonance (bother)

.662

Dissonance (uncomfort)

.559

Self-efficacy (easy)

.825

Self-efficacy (able)

.302

Self-efficacy (can)

.787
.747

Cost (time)
Cost (access)

7

.305

Recommended effectiveness vulnerability
disciplinary
Recommended effectiveness vulnerability virus

Recommended effectiveness vulnerability legal

3

Factor
4
5

-.322
.371

Cost (money)

.652
-.309
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.704
.627

CHAPTER 5:
RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS
In this chapter, sample characteristics are described, the measurement items and
model are analyzed, and the results of analysis are presented and discussed.
Sample Characteristics
Data was collected using a pen-and-paper survey in lower-division undergraduate
classes in a prominent business school. Every on-campus section of this required course
was included in the survey. Surveying students in a single mass-enrollment, multisection
required course helped to ensure that the sample represented the cross-section of business
students in the school. The survey was conducted during the second week of the fall
semester to ensure the stability of the enrollment and minimize the number of students
skipping classes. There were 457 students enrolled in several sections of the course, and
386 students attended the class on the dates of survey (84%). All 386 students agreed to
participate in the study and signed consent forms.
Missing Data
From the 386 completed questionnaires, 376 were usable. Due to missing data, 10
questionnaires were removed from the study. The removed questionnaires omitted all
measurement items of at least one construct. The percentage of removal was low
(2.66%), and the final usable subjects per number of item ratio was close to 10:1 (376
subjects to 34 items), as recommended by Nunnally (1978). The demographic profiles of
the sample, both before and after removing missing data, are presented in Table 8.
There was very little change in the demographic profile between the full sample
and the usable sample after the questionnaires that were missing data were removed. In
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addition, for gender and age ranges, the usable sample profiles were consistent with the
official demographics of the business school’s lower-division population during the datacollection period.

Table 8
Demographic Profile of the Sample
All sample
Demographic
Frequency
Percent

Usable sample

Frequency

Percent

Freshman
population (%)

Gender
Female

160

41.45

155

41.22

47.39

Male

255

58.29

221

58.78

52.61

1

0.26

-

-

-

Full-time

96

24.87

93

24.73

N.A.

Part-time

196

50.78

194

51.60

N.A.

Do not work

92

23.83

88

23.40

N.A.

Missing answer

2

0.52

1

0.27

-

0

0.00

0

0.00

-

16 to 25

318

82.38

311

82.71

85.92

26 to 35

43

11.14

43

11.44

9.21

36 to 45

15

3.89

14

3.72

More than 45

8

2.07

7

1.86

Missing answer

2

0.52

1

0.27

-

386

100.00

376

100.00

100.00

Missing answer
Working status

Age range
Less than 16

Total

}

4.87

Table 9 compares means and standard deviations of all measurement items both
before and after removing missing data. Most of the differences are in the second decimal
place for both mean and standard deviation.
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Table 9
Descriptive Statistics of Measurements
Full sample (486)
Usable sample (376)
Standard
Standard SkewMean deviation Mean deviation ness Kurtosis

Valid
n

Missing

Vulnerability 1

386

0

4.77

1.51

4.75

1.50

-0.30

-0.61

Severity 1

386

0

5.30

1.36

5.30

1.34

-0.47

-0.35

Vulnerability 2

386

0

5.60

1.38

5.60

1.36

-0.94

0.40

Severity 2

386

0

5.63

1.18

5.63

1.16

-0.51

-0.21

Vulnerability 3

384

2

4.78

1.45

4.78

1.45

-0.27

-0.54

Severity 3

384

2

5.75

1.33

5.76

1.31

-0.98

0.56

Cognitive dissonance 1

385

1

4.54

1.76

4.55

1.75

-0.36

-0.71

Cognitive dissonance 2

385

1

4.88

1.72

4.86

1.72

-0.61

-0.37

Cognitive dissonance 3

385

1

4.16

1.91

4.17

1.92

-0.19

-1.05

Threat evaluation 1

378

8

5.21

1.27

5.20

1.27

-0.58

-0.56

Threat evaluation 2

378

8

5.44

1.24

5.43

1.24

-0.36

-0.82

Threat evaluation 3

378

8

5.30

1.36

5.30

1.36

-0.04

-0.94

Threat evaluation 4

378

8

5.19

1.33

5.19

1.32

0.17

-0.78

Current effectiveness 1

386

0

4.93

1.68

4.95

1.67

-0.36

-0.89

Current effectiveness 2

384

2

4.69

1.74

4.70

1.74

0.23

-0.88

Current effectiveness 3

386

0

4.20

1.78

4.21

1.77

-0.48

0.13

Current effectiveness 4

386

0

3.78

1.74

3.79

1.74

-0.45

0.00

Current effectiveness 5

386

0

4.61

1.80

4.61

1.80

-0.65

0.25

Current effectiveness 6

386

0

3.58

1.80

3.59

1.81

-0.50

0.17

Self-efficacy 1

386

0

5.89

1.42

5.88

1.43

-1.35

1.16

Self-efficacy 2

386

0

5.94

1.41

5.91

1.42

-1.32

1.12

Self-efficacy 3

385

1

5.99

1.39

5.98

1.40

-1.48

1.70

Perceived cost 1

386

0

2.62

1.80

2.65

1.81

0.85

-0.36

Perceived cost 2

386

0

2.06

1.50

2.08

1.51

1.43

1.27

Perceived cost 3

386

0

2.44

1.81

2.45

1.81

1.01

-0.18

Recommended effectiveness 1

385

1

5.63

1.62

5.63

1.61

-1.19

0.68

Recommended effectiveness 2

385

1

5.55

1.55

5.54

1.55

-0.95

0.20

Recommended effectiveness 3

384

2

5.66

1.47

5.65

1.47

-1.00

0.18

Recommended effectiveness 4

384

2

5.57

1.51

5.56

1.51

-0.93

0.10

Recommended effectiveness 5

385

1

5.61

1.49

5.59

1.50

-1.05

0.44

Recommended effectiveness 6

385

1

5.53

1.51

5.51

1.51

-0.82

-0.21

Intention 1

385

1

5.88

1.52

5.89

1.49

-1.32

1.04

Intention 2

385

1

5.93

1.48

5.95

1.46

-1.39

1.27

Intention 3

385

1

6.00

1.44

6.01

1.42

-1.39

1.09

Item
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Reliability and Validity of Measures
Most of the measurements used in this study were the measurement items that
have been tested and used in prior TPB and PMT research as described in Chapter 4.
However, it is a good practice to measure qualities for the constructs in the model. The
following indicators were used to demonstrate reliability and validity of measures.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
Since this study was based on a well-established theory and measurements and the
measurement model already has a predefined covariance structure, a confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) would have been sufficient (Bollen, 1989). But there are advantages in an
exploratory factor analysis (EFA), which allows measurement items to load freely onto
factors without a predefined structure. First, the loading structure helps to confirm the
measurement model if the loading structure is the same as measurement model. Second,
item cross-loading helps to identify potential discriminant validity problems if item crossloadings are high.
The threat severity and vulnerability to the threat items were omitted from the
EFA because they will be combined into three composite items and used as single-item
measurements that do not load onto any factor or latent variable. All latent constructs,
with the exception of perceived cost, were modeled as reflective. Though perceived cost
in this study was proposed to be formative, the perceived cost items were included in the
EFA to test how they might perform if specified as reflective. The EFA results in Table
10 show that measurements of each construct mainly load into their own factors. Total
variance explained from 8 factors is 77.19%. The loadings for all items, aside from
current effectiveness 6 (0.693) and cognitive dissonance 3 (0.685), were higher than 0.7.
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Table 10
Exploratory Factor Analysis: Cross Loading—Principal Component with Varimax
Rotation
1

2

3

Factor
4

Recommended effectiveness 5 (REB5)

.861

.085

.106

.078

.068

.003

-.181

Recommended effectiveness 3 (REB3)

.855

.083

.089

.052

.135

-.018

-.192

Recommended effectiveness 1 (REB1)

.839

.137

.054

.079

.033

-.058

-.118

Recommended effectiveness 4 (REB4)

.838

.049

.034

.129

.134

-.025

-.137

Recommended effectiveness 2 (REB2)

.832

.146

.057

.139

.131

-.009

-.150

Recommended effectiveness 6 (REB6)

.811

.053

.079

.135

.166

.048

-.078

Current effectiveness 5 (CEB5)

.089

.835

-.062

-.009

.036

-.128

-.050

Current effectiveness 2 (CEB2)

.097

.826

-.059

-.048

.045

-.114

-.126

Current effectiveness 1 (CEB1)

.124

.824

-.100

-.052

.092

-.123

-.089

Current effectiveness 3 (CEB3)

.103

.819

-.012

.046

.100

-.020

.003

Current effectiveness 4 (CEB4)

.011

.798

-.062

-.006

.004

-.078

-.022

Current effectiveness 6 (CEB6)

.080

.693

-.067

-.011

-.095

-.145

-.055

Threat evaluation 1 (T1)

.039

-.120

.871

.045

.050

.192

-.023

Threat evaluation 4 (T4)

.098

-.037

.869

.084

.031

.162

-.001

Threat evaluation 2 (T2)

.112

-.090

.861

.051

.096

.137

-.035

Threat evaluation 3 (T3)

.118

-.080

.843

.095

.009

.214

.005

Intention 3 (I3)

.172

-.046

.076

.905

.204

.066

-.095

Intention 2 (I2)

.173

-.024

.104

.901

.261

.053

-.148

Intention 1 (I1)

.203

-.024

.123

.878

.237

.083

-.195

Self-efficacy 3 (SE3)

.180

.049

.037

.194

.858

-.021

-.204

Self-efficacy 2 (SE2)

.185

.069

.096

.236

.845

.018

-.174

Self-efficacy 1 (SE1)

.209

.040

.057

.252

.837

.001

-.126

Cognitive dissonance 2 (D2)

.011

-.195

.207

-.007

-.008

.855

.037

Cognitive dissonance 1 (D1)

.010

-.198

.275

.126

.002

.813

-.030

Cognitive dissonance 3 (D3)

-.089

-.232

.338

.080

.003

.685

.057

Perceived cost 2 (C2)

-.268

-.089

-.084

-.175

-.164

.022

.773

Perceived cost 1 (C1)

-.324

-.165

.038

-.058

-.112

-.026

.748

Perceived cost 3 (C3)

-.224

-.077

.003

-.212

-.263

.071

.734

Item
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5

6

7

From the results of EFA, it was concluded that there were eight underlying factors
in the measurement items included for analysis. All items that are supposed to measure
the same factor were grouped, which implied convergent validity and unidimensionality
of the constructs. The cross-loadings were low and limited to the cross-loadings between
the constructs that are hypothesized to have relationships.
Measurement Item Parceling
Perceived effectiveness of current behavior (CE) and perceived effectiveness of
recommended protection (RE) were measured by six items per construct. The items were
based on three salient threats and two threat reduction methods, including reducing
severity and reducing vulnerability. The proposed combination rule for the variables was
an additive rule, as described in Chapter 3. The question arose in regard to this construct
as to whether the items should be combined into three parcels per construct to form a
composite item of effectiveness against each threat or whether they should be employed
as six items per construct and the threat structure of the measurements subsequently
disregarded.
Combining a large number of items into a smaller number of composite items per
construct is referred to as parceling. Item parceling is a widely used technique in many
research areas, including psychology, management, marketing, and education. In MIS,
Taylor and Todd (1995), without specifically mentioning the term “parceling,” used total
aggregating parceling to form a single composite item for each construct in their data
analysis to reduce the number of items and increase the ratio of subjects per item in the
structural equation analysis.
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There are multiple reasons why researchers use parceling. The most frequently
stated reasons are: to improve distribution of the items, to improve model fit, and to
reduce the number of items. However, many opponents of parceling believe that
parceling simply manipulates data and should not be used. In this study, parceling was
used because the theoretical basis for solutions to each threat arose from a combination of
effectiveness against both severity and vulnerability. Nonetheless, both the parceling
model and the full-item model were tested and compared to determine the best way to
measure the constructs.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
The measurement model was tested with a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).
Unlike the EFA, which seeks to find a model that fits the data, the CFA tests a
hypothesized factor model by assessing whether or not the data supports the hypothesized
model.
The relationships of observed variables and latent variables were based on the
measurement scales previously described. For the full-item model, there were 28
observed variables with 7 latent variables. The hypothesized relationships between
observed variables and latent variables are presented on the left side of Figure 16. Each
observed variable was hypothesized to measure only a single latent variable, and all latent
variables were expected to correlate. However, no correlation among measurement errors
of the observed variables was specified. The parceling model on the right side of Figure
16 has the same model specifications as the full model but with only 22 observed
variables.
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SPSS AMOS version 16 (Arbuckle, 2007) was used to estimate the parameters
and fit indices of the model. There were some observed variables that had a high degree
of skewness, which indicated a deviation from the normal distribution assumption.
Asymptotically, distribution-free estimation is normally recommended for non-normal
data (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004, p. 67). However, this particular estimation method
also requires a large sample size and may not improve estimation over maximum
likelihood approaches (ML). Therefore, maximum likelihood estimation is used in
parameter estimation because it is robust enough for minor deviations from normal
distribution assumptions (Bollen, 1989; Byrne, 1998) and requires a smaller sample size.
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Figure 16. Confirmatory factor analysis models—Full-item model and parceling model.
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The maximum likelihood regression weight estimates of the full-item model and
the parceling model are presented in Tables 11 and 12. All of the estimates were
significantly different from zero (p < 0.001), and all regression weights were positive, as
expected. Finally, all standardized regression weights were less than 1, and all error
variances were positive. The widely used fit indices of both models are reported in
Table 13.

Table 11
Parameter Estimates for the Measurement Model (Full Items)
Latent variable
Perceived cost (C)

Perceived current
effectiveness
(CEB)

Cognitive
dissonance (D)
Behavioral
intention (I)
Perceived
recommended
effectiveness
(REB)

Self-efficacy (SE)

Measurement
item
C1
C2
C3
CEB1
CEB2
CEB3
CEB4
CEB5
CEB6
D1
D2
D3
I1
I2
I3
REB1
REB2
REB3
REB4
REB5
REB6
SE1
SE2
SE3

Standardized
regression weight
0.708
0.776
0.770
0.873
0.858
0.746
0.687
0.828
0.620
0.833
0.808
0.721
0.946
0.976
0.913
0.825
0.855
0.875
0.840
0.874
0.802
0.854
0.893
0.881
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Square multiple
correlation
0.502
0.602
0.593
0.762
0.735
0.557
0.473
0.685
0.385
0.693
0.652
0.520
0.895
0.952
0.833
0.681
0.731
0.765
0.706
0.764
0.643
0.729
0.798
0.776

Table 11 (continued)
Latent variable
Threat evaluation
(T)

Measurement
item
T1
T2
T3
T4

Standardized
regression weight
0.869
0.850
0.848
0.846

Square multiple
correlation
0.755
0.723
0.720
0.715

Table 12
Parameter Estimates for the Measurement Model (Parceling)
Latent variable
Perceived cost (C)

Perceived current
effectiveness
(CEB)
Cognitive
dissonance (D)
Behavioral
intention (I)
Perceived
recommended
effectiveness
(REB)
Self-efficacy (SE)

Threat evaluation
(T)

Measurement
item
C1
C2
C3
CEB1 + CEB2
CEB3 + CEB 4
CEB5 + CEB6
D1
D2
D3
I1
I2
I3
REB1 + REB2
REB3 + REB4

Standardized
regression weight
0.704
0.776
0.774
0.828
0.804
0.895
0.835
0.807
0.719
0.946
0.976
0.913
0.850
0.927

REB5 + REB6

0.914

0.835

SE1
SE2
SE3
T1
T2
T3
T4

0.854
0.893
0.881
0.869
0.851
0.848
0.846

0.730
0.797
0.777
0.756
0.723
0.719
0.715
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Square multiple
correlation
0.495
0.602
0.599
0.686
0.647
0.800
0.696
0.652
0.517
0.895
0.952
0.833
0.722
0.859

Table 13
Fit Indices of Measurement Models
Fit index
2

χ /df
Goodness–of-fit index
Adjusted goodness-of-fit index
Comparative fit index
Parsimony comparative fit index
Root mean square residual
Standardized root mean square residual
Normed fit index
Root mean square error of approximation
Akaike information criterion
Expected cross-validation index

Recommended
≤ 3.00
≥ 0.90
≥ 0.85
≥ 0.90
≥ 0.80
≤ 0.10
≤ 0.05
≥ 0.90
≤ 0.05
smallest
smallest

All items
2.431
0.861
0.828
0.941
0.819
0.108
0.041
0.904
0.062
953.888
2.544

Parceling
1.808
0.920
0.893
0.975
0.794
0.150
0.036
0.946
0.046
469.946
1.253

There were three criteria used to assess structural equation models. The first
criterion tested for differences between the sample covariance matrix and the implied
covariance matrix from the estimated model. Generally, a statistically significant
difference between these two matrices is an undesirable result. When no differences are
detected, it can be presumed that the model fits the observed data well. Originally, the χ2
test was used to test this hypothesis. However, when sample sizes are large, χ2 tests
almost always reject the null hypothesis of indifference even for well-fitting models,
which is an undesirable outcome for model testing. Therefore, a number of fit indices
were developed to provide better evaluations of model fit. It should be noted that the
range of fit indices aside from χ2 are not statistically significant tests of differences
between the model and data. However, all of them indicate the degree of fit between
observed covariance and model covariance. The detailed evaluation of each criterion can
be found in the reviews by Bollen and Long (1993) as well as in Hu and Bentler (1995).
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For the results in Table 13, both models fit the data well across all criteria. The
goodness-of-fit, root mean square residual (RMSR), and root mean square error of
approximation (RMSEA) indices of the full-item model and RMSR of the parceling
model present values that fall slightly below recommended fit levels. However, RMSR is
not a good indicator of fit when the observed variables are measured with different
scales, which is the case for the parceling model, where current effectiveness and
recommended effectiveness are measured as a result of summation of the two items.
Therefore, the standardized RMSR is recommended over the RMSR (Kline, 1998, p.
141), and both models have standardized RMSR levels that are better than the
recommended level. Based on the comparison between the two measurement models’ fit
indices, it can be concluded that both models have acceptable fit levels and that the
parceling model performs slightly better than the full-item model in terms of fit.
The second criterion for evaluating structural equation models was the statistical
significance of the paths in the model, i.e., for CFA, all the paths from latent variables to
their observed variable must be statistically significant. For both models, all regression
weights were statistically significant at p < 0.001, confirming the hypothesized factorloading structure.
The last criterion for model evaluation was the size and direction of the specified
relationships. The correlations between the latent variables are presented in Tables 14 and
15. The relationships between latent variables that were proposed in the research model
were all statistically significant at p < 0.001, with the exception of the relationship
between cognitive dissonance and behavioral intention, which was significant at
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p = 0.002. The directions of the relationship also confirm that the relationships specified
in the research model, which is negative for perceived cost, intention and current
effectiveness, cognitive dissonance and positive for the rest of relationships specified.

Table 14
Correlations between Constructs (Full Items)
D
Cognitive dissonance (D)
Threat evaluation (T)
Current effectiveness (CE)
Self-efficacy (SE)
Perceived cost (C)
Recommended effectiveness (RE)
Intention (I)

1
0.573
-0.426
0.023
0.068
-0.015
0.183

T

CE

SE

1
0.143
-0.271
0.236
-0.014

1
-0.568
0.420
0.564

T

CE

SE

C

1
-0.200
0.167
-0.087
0.197
0.238

1
0.116
-0.261
0.220
-0.026

1
-0.568
0.421
0.564

1
-0.598
-0.475

1
-0.194
0.167
-0.087
0.200
0.238

C

1
-0.606
-0.475

RE

I

1
0.364

1

Table 15
Correlations between Constructs (Parceling)
D
Cognitive dissonance (D)
1
Threat evaluation (T)
0.573
Current effectiveness (CE)
-0.435
Self-efficacy (SE)
0.024
Perceived cost (C)
0.068
Recommended effectiveness (RE) -0.013
Intention (I)
0.184

RE

I

1
0.368

1

In addition to evaluating the CFA model, convergent validity, discriminant
validity, and reliability of the measurement scales needed to be assessed before the
research model could be fully tested. The most commonly used indicators of reliability of
the measurement scales are listed in Table 16. The criterion for internal consistency for
measurement scales indicated that Cronbach’s α reaches 0.7 or higher (see Nunnally
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[1978]). All of the measurement scales in this study produced Cronbach’s α levels greater
than the recommended 0.7, confirming that the scales had an acceptable level of internal
consistency. The nonparceling scale of current effectiveness and recommended
effectiveness had slightly higher α levels than the parceling counterpart, since α levels
tend to be higher when the number of scale items is higher.

Table 16
Reliability of Measurement Scales
No. of
items

Cronbach's
α

Average
variance
extracted

Composite
reliability

Cognitive dissonance

3

0.824

0.622

0.831

Threat evaluation

4

0.914

0.728

0.915

Current effectiveness

6

0.898

0.582

0.892

Current effectiveness (parcels)

3

0.879

0.711

0.880

Self-efficacy

3

0.908

0.768

0.934

Perceived cost

3

0.790

0.565

0.796

Recommended effectiveness

6

0.937

0.701

0.934

Recommended effectiveness (parcels)

3

0.924

0.805

0.925

Behavioral intention

3

0.961

0.893

0.962

Scale

An additional reliability indicator, shown in Table 16, is average variance
extracted (AVE) (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & William, 1998). Average variance
extracted is a measurement of whether the items truly represent their hypothesized latent
variable. The AVE is recommended to be 0.5 or higher (Byrne, 1998; Hair et al., 1998).
All measurement scales in this study had AVE scores higher than the recommended level.
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In addition, the parceling scales performed better than nonparceling scales in terms of
AVE.
The final reliability indicator in Table 16 is composite reliability (Hair et al.,
1998). Composite reliability is a complementary measure of AVE, measuring whether or
not items in the same scale measure the same construct (Byrne, 1998). Hair et al. (1998)
recommend composite reliability to be 0.5 or higher. Again, all measurements in this
study have composite reliability levels higher than the recommended value, and the
parceling scales have higher composite reliability than the nonparceling scales.
According to Fornell and Larcker (1981), discriminant validity can be
demonstrated when the square root of the AVE for each construct is larger than the
correlation of the construct in question with other constructs. The comparisons of the
square root of the AVE and correlation are listed in Tables 17 and 18, which present the
square root of the AVE in the diagonal and Pearson’s correlations in the off-diagonal.
The results of the comparisons show that each construct differed from other constructs
and, therefore, the measurements have good discriminant validity.

Table 17
Square Root of Average Variance Extracted and Correlations between Constructs (Full
Items)
Cognitive dissonance (D)
Threat evaluation (T)
Current effectiveness (CE)
Self-efficacy (SE)
Perceived cost (C)

D
T
CE
SE
0.789
0.573 0.853
-0.426 -0.194 0.763
0.023 0.167 0.143 0.876
0.068 -0.087 -0.271 -0.568

Recommended effectiveness (RE)
Intention (I)

-0.015
0.183

0.200 0.236
0.238 -0.014
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C

RE

I

0.752

0.420 -0.606
0.564 -0.475

0.837
0.364

0.945

Table 18
Square Root of Average Variance Extracted and Correlations between Constructs
(Parceling)
Cognitive dissonance (D)
Threat evaluation (T)
Current effectiveness (CE)
Self-efficacy (SE)
Perceived cost (C)
Recommended effectiveness (RE)
Intention (I)

D
T
CE
SE
C
0.789
0.573 0.853
-0.435 -0.200 0.843
0.024 0.167 0.116 0.876
0.068 -0.087 -0.261 -0.568 0.752
-0.013 0.197 0.220 0.421 -0.598
0.184 0.238 -0.026 0.564 -0.475

RE

0.897
0.368

I

0.945

The EFA and CFA results confirmed that the measurements used in this study
correctly assessed the proposed underlying constructs. The measurements also show good
reliability and convergent validity as demonstrated by Cronbach’s α, AVE, and
composite reliability. Finally, the discriminant validity of the measurements was
demonstrated by the comparison of the square roots of the AVE and the correlations
between constructs. Therefore, it can be concluded that the measurement model in this
study represented a good fit to the data. It should be noted here that perceived cost, which
is hypothesized to be a formative measure, performs very well when tested as a reflective
measure. Even so, it is specified as a formative for model testing.
With regard to the parceling model, not only does this model have the same (and
in many cases better) reliability and validity as the full-item model, but it was also easier
to use due to it having fewer items. In addition, grouping items into effectiveness against
individual threat rather than effectiveness against severity and vulnerability of each
threat made them easier to interpret. Therefore, the parceling model will be used in the
testing of the research model in the next section.
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Research Model Testing
In general, structural equation modeling software such as LISREL, AMOS, and
EQS are best suited for models of reflective measures, owing to the difficulty of fitting
formative measures in covariance structures. For this reason, most of the studies that
focus on formative indicators use modeling software that is based on partial least square
(PLS), such as PLS Graph (Chin, 1988) and SmartPLS (Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2009).
However, some studies have demonstrated that formative indicators can be modeled
within covariance structures by estimating the indicator-loading parameters in the
multiple indicators and multiple causes (MIMIC) model (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer,
2001). The research model in this study was based on a well-established theory, and the
main purpose of the study was to assess the model as a whole rather than testing
individual relationships within the model. For this reason, the covariance structure
approach, which provides fit indices to assess overall fit rather than PLS estimates, which
only provides local fit indices (i.e., regression weights and square multiple correlation),
was more suitable for this study.
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Figure 17. Hypothesized structural equation of the research model.
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SPSS AMOS version 16 was used to assess the structural equation model shown
in Figure 17 (the covariance between exogenous latent variables are omitted from the
figure for the sake of simplicity). Consistent with the measurement model, maximum
likelihood (ML) was used for parameter estimation. Fitting of the formative indicator
portion of the theoretical model follows the process outlined by Diamantopoulos and
Winklhofer (2001) and in later studies (Bruhn, Georgi, & Hadwich, 2008; Cadogan,
Souchon, & Procter, 2008; Ruiz, Gremler, Washburn, & Carrion 2008).
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Figure 18. Parameters in the MIMIC model and structural equation model.
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The MIMIC model shown in Figure 18a was used to estimate indicator loading
for perceived cost. Then, the loadings and covariances between indicators were used as
fixed parameters in the structural equation model as illustrated in Figure 18b. The
regression weight of C1 was nonsignificant at p = 0.05 and also in the opposite direction
from that hypothesized. These could be a sign of multicollinearity (Bollen, 1989).
Therefore, the C1 was removed from the model, and the MIMIC model was tested again.
Most of the fit indices of the MIMIC model in Table 19 are better than the recommended
values with the exception of RMSEA. In the structural equation model analysis presented
in the next section, perceived cost was found to have a relatively low effect on behavioral
intention. This could be a reason why RMSEA for the MIMIC model was higher than the
recommended level. However, even if the RMSEA value suggests that the MIMIC model
does not fit well with data, there are other indices that indicate a good fit between the
hypothesized model and the observed data. Therefore, the estimations of indicator
loadings from the MIMIC model were deemed acceptable and were used in the structural
equation model in the next section.

Table 19
Fit Indices of MIMIC Models
Fit index
2
χ /df
Goodness-of-fit index
Adjusted goodness-of-fit index
Comparative fit index
Parsimony comparative fit index
Root mean square residual
Standardized root mean square residual
Normed fit index

Recommended values
≤ 3.00
≥ 0.90
≥ 0.85
≥ 0.90
≥ 0.80
≤ 0.10
≤ 0.05
≥ 0.90
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Result
4.672
0.977
0.918
0.990
0.396
0.061
0.020
0.988

Table 19 (continued)
Fit index
RMSEA
RMSEA Lo 90
RMSEA Hi 90

Recommended values
≤ 0.05
≤ 0.10

Result
0.100
0.064
0.137

Structural Equation Model
The regression weights 0.193 for the C2 and 0.223 for the C3 and the covariance
1.636 of C2 and C3 were set as the fixed parameters in the structural equation model. The
structural model was then assessed by the same three criteria as in the measurement
model above. The three criteria were fit indices, significance of the parameters estimated,
and the direction of the relationships.

Table 20
Fit Indices of Hypothesized Structural Models
Fit index
Recommended values
2
≤ 3.00
χ /df
≥ 0.90
Goodness-of-fit index
≥ 0.85
Adjusted goodness of fit index
≥ 0.90
Comparative fit index
≥ 0.80
Parsimony comparative fit index
≤ 0.10
Root mean square residual
≤ 0.05
Standardized root mean square residual
≥ 0.90
Normed fit index
≤ 0.05
RMSEA
RMSEA Lo 90
≤ 0.10
RMSEA Hi 90

Results
1.810
0.918
0.888
0.972
0.775
0.430
0.038
0.940
0.046
0.039
0.054

The most commonly used fit indices of the hypothesized model in Table 20 show
that the model fit well with the data. Of all the fit indices presented, only RMSR and
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parsimony comparative fit index (PCFI) fell outside the recommended levels. The low
value of PCFI can be explained by the number of parameters added to the model in view
of the formative indicators compared to the reflective indicators. For the RMSR, the
observed variables in the hypothesized model have different scales, especially for the
effectiveness items and the threat beliefs items, which can cause RMSR to inflate.
Therefore, standardized RMSR should be used to evaluate this model rather than RMSR.
The estimations of the regression weights in Figure 19 and Table 21 shows that all
but two proposed relationships are significant at a 99% confidence interval. The
relationship from perceived recommended effectiveness to behavioral intention as well as
the direct relationship from threat evaluation to behavioral intention were found to be
nonsignificant.

Table 21
Standardized Regression Weight and 99% Confidence Interval (CI)
Standardized
99% CI
regression
Lower
Upper
Relationship
weight
Direct loss Æ Threat evaluation

0.24

0.11

0.37

Virus Æ Threat evaluation

0.31

0.18

0.44

ID theft Æ Threat evaluation

0.28

0.15

0.41

Threat evaluation Æ Cognitive dissonance

0.52

0.37

0.67

Current effectiveness Æ Cognitive dissonance

-0.35

-0.49

-0.21

Threat evaluation Æ Behavioral intention

0.04

-0.11

0.19

Cognitive dissonance Æ Behavioral intention

0.17

0.01

0.32
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Table 21 (continued)
Standardized
regression
weight

Lower

Upper

Recommended effectiveness Æ Behavioral
intention

0.09

-0.11

0.19

Self-efficacy Æ Behavioral intention

0.42

0.28

0.56

Perceived cost Æ Behavioral intention

-0.19

-0.33

-0.05

Relationship
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99% CI

Figure 19. AMOS estimated regression weightsa and significance level of hypothesized model.
a

Standardized weights in parenthesis.
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For the relationships in the model that were found to be significant, the following
proposed hypotheses were confirmed:
•

All threat beliefs positively affect threat evaluation.

•

Perceived effectiveness of current behavior negatively affects cognitive
dissonance.

•

Threat evaluation positively affects cognitive dissonance.

•

Cognitive dissonance positively affects behavioral intention.

•

Perceived cost negatively affects behavioral intention.

•

Perceived self-efficacy positively affects behavioral intention.

While the relationships between perceived recommended effectiveness and
behavioral intention and the relationship between threat evaluation and behavioral
intention also conformed to the proposed expectations, they cannot be interpreted as
confirming that portion of the model because they were found to be nonsignificant.

Table 22
Squared Multiple Correlations (R2) and Effect Size (f 2)
for Endogenous Variables
Constructs
Threat evaluation
Cognitive dissonance
Behavioral intention

R2
0.451
0.440
0.394

Effect size (ƒ2)
0.820
0.787
0.649

The estimated squared multiple correlations (R2) and estimated effect sizes (ƒ2)
(Cohen, 1992) of the endogenous variables are reported in Table 22. According to Cohen
(1992), values indicative of small, medium, and large effect sizes are ƒ2 = 0.02, 0.15, and
0.35. Therefore, all effect sizes in the research model are considered to be large.
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Table 23
Standardized Total Effects

Direct loss belief
Malware belief
Identity theft belief
Perceived current
effectiveness
Threat evaluation
Cognitive dissonance
Perceived recommended
effectiveness
Perceived cost
Perceived self-efficacy
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Threat
evaluation
0.241**
0.308**
0.283**

Dependent variable
Cognitive
Behavioral
dissonance
intention
**
0.126
0.030*
**
0.161
0.039**
0.148**
0.036**
-0.348**
0.523**
-

-

-

-0.058**
0.126**
0.166**
0.091
-0.187**
0.420**

The total effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable is the
amount of change in the dependent variable that results from the change of the
independent variable by one unit. The total effect is equal to the sum of direct effects and
indirect effects through a mediating variable. The standardized total effects of
independent variables on dependent variables are shown in Table 23.

Table 24
Comparison of Fit Indices of the Formative Model and the Reflective Model
Model with perceived Model with perceived
Fit index
cost as formative
cost as reflective
2
χ /df
1.810
1.822
Goodness-of-fit index
0.918
0.910
Adjusted goodness-of-fit index
0.888
0.881
Comparative fit index
0.972
0.969
Parsimony comparative fit index
0.775
0.798
Root mean square residual
0.430
0.428
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Table 24 (continued)

Fit index
Standardized root mean square residual
Normed fit index
Root mean square error of
approximation (RMSEA)
RMSEA Lo 90
RMSEA Hi 90

Model with perceived
cost as formative
0.038
0.940

Model with perceived
cost as reflective
0.040
0.935

0.046
0.039
0.054

0.047
0.040
0.054

Table 25
Comparison of Standardized Regression Weights of the Formative, Reflective, and
Partial Least Square -formative(PLS) Models
Standardized regression weight
Formative

Reflective

PLS

Direct loss Æ Threat evaluation

0.24**

0.24**

0.22**

Virus Æ Threat evaluation

0.31**

0.31**

0.30**

ID Theft Æ Threat evaluation

0.28**

0.28**

0.27**

Threat evaluation Æ Cognitive dissonance

0.52**

0.52**

0.46**

Current effectiveness Æ Cognitive dissonance

-0.35**

-0.35**

-0.30**

0.04

0.04

0.06

0.17**

0.17**

0.15*

0.09

0.06

0.10

Self-efficacy Æ Behavioral intention

0.42**

0.40**

0.38**

Perceived cost Æ Behavioral intention

-0.19**

-0.22**

-0.20*

Relationship

Threat evaluation Æ Behavioral intention
Cognitive dissonance Æ Behavioral intention
Recommended effectiveness Æ Behavioral
intention

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.

For comparison purposes, the fit indices of the research model with perceived cost
as a reflective construct versus a version that treats perceived cost as a formative
construct are compared in Table 24. Most of the fit indices from the formative model,
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with an exception of PCFI, are generally the same or slightly better than in the reflective
model. The reason that PCFI of the reflective model is better than in the formative model
is because the number of parameters in the formative model is higher than reflective
model and result in lower degree for freedom and lower PCFI.
To validate the results and for a point of comparison, the research model was
tested further by using SmartPLS (Ringle et al., 2009). The comparison of standardized
regression weights of the three models is presented in Table 25. All the standardized
regression weights from three models were comparable in magnitude, direction, and
significance level.
Group Analysis
Survey respondents were exposed to three different solution recommendations,
forming the basis for a group analysis. The three subject groups based on recommended
protections were (1) to stop responding to phishing messages, (2) to use antiphishing
features of web browsers, and (3) to use anti-malware software. The purpose of the group
analysis was to determine whether the hypothesized model of response to threats holds
true for every solution recommendation. The group analysis began with the test of group
differences on observed variables to confirm the effect of the recommended message.
Then, the measurement model was tested to confirm model equivalence across each of
the recommendation groups. Finally, the research model was tested to confirm causal
structure equivalence. The processes of testing measurement model and structural
equation model followed the recommendation of Byrne (2009) and Cheung and Rensvold
(2002).
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It should be noted here that in the group analysis, all constructs were assumed to
have a reflective measurement model. The reason for assuming that all constructs were
reflective is because there was no prior research that examined the formative and
performed a group analysis. In addition, the formative construct modeling process and the
group analysis process are somewhat in conflict, and it is unclear how to specify the
indicator loadings. Since the results from modeling formative perceived cost and
reflective perceived cost are almost identical, it should be safe to perform a group
analysis with reflective perceived cost in place of formative perceived cost for purposes
of group analysis.
The recommended protection messages and the position of them in the
questionnaire were designed to ensure that they both had an effect on only the solution
variables (i.e., recommended effectiveness, perceived cost, and perceived self-efficacy)
and not on problem variables (i.e., threat evaluation, perceived current effectiveness, and
cognitive dissonance). The ANOVA test results shown in Table 26 confirm that the three
groups do not have any statistically significant differences on any current effectiveness,
threat evaluation, or cognitive dissonance items. However, the results of ANOVA tests of
solution and intention items shown in Table 27 found statistically significant differences
among groups on all items. Post hoc analysis found that the “stop responding” group was
significantly different from both the browser group and the anti-malware group, while not
significantly different between the two groups. Therefore, to reduce the complexity of
group analysis and to increase statistical power, both the browser and anti-malware
groups were combined, i.e., the software group, and the group analysis was tested
between the “stop responding” group and the “software” group. Results of t tests, as
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shown in Table 28, suggested that there were significant differences between groups on
all solution and intention items. In summary, the “stop responding” group had higher
perceived recommended effectiveness, higher perceived self-efficacy, higher behavioral
intention, and lower perceived cost.

Table 26
ANOVA Test of Mean Difference among Recommended Protection Groups (Problem
Items)
Item
Current
effectiveness 1

Current
effectiveness 2

Current
effectiveness 3

Threat
evaluation 1

Threat
evaluation 2

Threat
evaluation 3

Threat
evaluation 4

Group
Stop
Browser
Anti-malware
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-malware
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-malware
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-malware
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-malware
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-malware
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-malware
Total

n
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376

Mean
9.617
10.086
9.295
9.652
7.862
7.892
8.389
8.003
8.080
8.376
8.274
8.202
25.979
26.043
26.316
26.080
32.521
33.280
29.600
31.971
28.207
29.398
27.600
28.348
5.245
5.258
5.074
5.205
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Standard
deviation
3.355
3.074
3.125
3.234
3.380
2.865
3.095
3.188
3.236
2.855
3.177
3.125
12.532
12.358
11.653
12.241
11.502
10.915
10.995
11.292
11.641
12.418
12.270
11.982
1.225
1.406
1.214
1.268

Standard error
0.245
0.319
0.321
0.167
0.247
0.297
0.318
0.164
0.236
0.296
0.326
0.161
0.914
1.281
1.196
0.631
0.839
1.132
1.128
0.582
0.849
1.288
1.259
0.618
0.089
0.146
0.125
0.065

Level of
significance.
0.240

0.392

0.732

0.507

0.630

0.898

0.699

Table 26 (continued)

Item
Cognitive
dissonance 1

Cognitive
dissonance 2

Cognitive
dissonance 3

Group
Stop
Browser
Anti-malware
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-malware
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-malware
Total

n
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376

Mean
5.473
5.452
5.326
5.431
5.314
5.323
5.242
5.298
5.191
5.269
5.105
5.189

Standard
deviation
1.273
1.339
1.056
1.237
1.329
1.490
1.302
1.361
1.343
1.344
1.276
1.324

Standard error
0.093
0.139
0.108
0.064
0.097
0.155
0.134
0.070
0.098
0.139
0.131
0.068

Level of
significance.
0.376

0.562

0.926

Table 27
ANOVA Test of Mean Difference among Recommended Protection Groups (Solution and
Intention)
Item
Self-efficacy 1

Self-efficacy 2

Self-efficacy 3

Perceived
cost 1

Perceived
cost 2

Group
Stop
Browser
Anti-virus
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-virus
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-virus
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-virus
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-virus
Total

n
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376

Mean
6.229
5.409
5.632
5.875
6.335
5.409
5.579
5.915
6.410
5.452
5.632
5.976
2.399
3.151
2.674
2.654
1.633
2.677
2.368
2.077
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Standard
deviation
1.213
1.513
1.558
1.427
1.210
1.469
1.499
1.415
1.169
1.486
1.459
1.396
1.808
1.972
1.526
1.806
1.219
1.758
1.509
1.510

Standard error
0.088
0.157
0.160
0.074
0.088
0.152
0.154
0.073
0.085
0.154
0.150
0.072
0.132
0.205
0.157
0.093
0.089
0.182
0.155
0.078

Level of
significance
0.000

0.000

0.000

0.004

0.000

Table 27 (continued)

Item
Perceived cost
3

Recommended
effectiveness 1

Recommended
effectiveness 2

Recommended
effectiveness 3

Behavioral
intention 1

Behavioral
intention 2

Behavioral
intention 3

Group
Stop
Browser
Anti-virus
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-virus
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-virus
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-virus
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-virus
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-virus
Total
Stop
Browser
Anti-virus
Total

n
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376
188
93
95
376

Mean
1.702
3.226
3.158
2.447
11.681
10.613
10.695
11.168
11.830
10.312
10.863
11.210
11.777
10.409
10.442
11.101
6.330
5.280
5.632
5.894
6.383
5.355
5.674
5.949
6.362
5.538
5.789
6.013

Standard
deviation
1.347
1.968
1.841
1.806
2.953
3.036
2.832
2.981
2.657
2.840
2.716
2.788
2.756
2.779
2.542
2.786
1.183
1.696
1.578
1.495
1.081
1.646
1.640
1.457
1.155
1.619
1.515
1.419

Standard error
0.098
0.204
0.189
0.093
0.215
0.315
0.291
0.154
0.194
0.294
0.279
0.144
0.201
0.288
0.261
0.144
0.086
0.176
0.162
0.077
0.079
0.171
0.168
0.075
0.084
0.168
0.155
0.073

Level of
significance
0.000

0.004

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Table 28
t Test of Mean Difference between Recommended Groups
Level of
significance
Mean
Item
(2-tailed)
difference
t
Perceived cost 1 -2.766
0.006
-0.511
Perceived cost 2 -5.961
< 0.001
-0.888
Perceived cost 3 -8.768
< 0.001
-1.489
Self-efficacy1
4.957
< 0.001
0.707
Self-efficacy 2
6.021
< 0.001
0.840
Self-efficacy 3
6.327
< 0.001
0.867
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Standard
error
difference
0.185
0.149
0.170
0.143
0.140
0.137

99% CI
Lower
-0.989
-1.274
-1.929
0.338
0.479
0.512

Upper
-0.033
-0.503
-1.050
1.077
1.202
1.222

Table 28 (continued)

Item
Recommended
effectiveness 1
Recommended
effectiveness 2
Recommended
effectiveness 3
Intention 1
Intention 2
Intention 3

t
3.385

Level of
significance
(2-tailed)
0.001

Mean
difference
1.027

Standard
error
difference
0.303

Lower
0.241

Upper
1.812

4.415

< 0.001

1.239

0.281

0.513

1.966

4.841

< 0.001

1.351

0.279

0.628

2.074

5.909
6.036
4.906

< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001

0.872
0.867
0.697

0.148
0.144
0.142

0.490
0.495
0.329

1.255
1.239
1.065

99% CI

Before causal structure invariance can be tested, measurement model invariance
conditions need to be confirmed (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004, p. 327; Byrne, 2009,
p. 197). The purpose of the test of measurement model invariance is to ensure that the
measurement model holds true for every group or that every group was measured by the
same measurement model. To test measurement model invariance, four nested models
were created with added levels of constraints (see Table 29). Then, the more stringent
models were compared with the unconstrained model to find whether or not they were
significantly different from the unconstrained model. Measurement model invariance
level is established when the constrained model is not significantly different from the
unconstrained model.
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Table 29
Description of Nested Measurement Model
Model
Unconstrained
Measurement weights
Structural covariances
Measurement residuals

Constraint
Regression weight of measurement items
Measurement weights model + Covariances between latent variables
Structural covariances model + Variance of measurement error

Conventionally, nested model comparison is done by testing the statistical
difference of the increasing χ2 per increasing degrees of freedom. The results in Table 30
show that all models are significantly different from unconstrained models at p = 0.05.
Therefore, measurement model invariance cannot be established based on χ2 evaluation.
However, many researchers (Cudeck & Brown, 1983; MacCallum, Roznowski, &
Necowitz, 1992) argue that χ2 difference testing is overly stringent and an impractical test
of invariance. Based on this argument, Cheung and Rensvold (2002) propose a new
invariance criteria based on CFI differences (ΔCFI), which is the difference between the
CFI of the unconstrained model and the CFI of the constrained model. According to
Cheung and Rensvold (2002), if the ΔCFI of the constrained model is less than 0.01 from
the unconstrained model, it can be considered invariant between groups at the level of
constraint.

Table 30
Nested Measurement Model Comparison (Assume Unconstrained Model to be Corrected)
Δ χ2
Δ df
Model
χ2
df
P
Unconstrained
639.75
376
Measurement weights
668.27
391
28.52
15
0.018
Structural covariances
746.50
419
106.75
43
0.000
Measurement residuals
886.72
441
246.97
65
0.000
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The ΔCFI of the measurement weight model was less than 0.01 (see Table 31).
That means that the stop group and the software group have invariant measurement
weights in the measurement model. For the structure covariance model, where the
constraint measures both weight and covariance, the ΔCFI is slightly above 0.01. That
means that the measurement model also has borderline invariance covariance structure
between groups.

Table 31
CFI of the Nested Measurement Models
Model
CFI
Unconstrained
0.955
Measurement weights
0.953
Structural covariances
0.945
Measurement residuals
0.926

ΔCFI
0.002
0.010
0.030

Once the measurement model was confirmed invariance between groups, causal
structure invariance can be tested by using the same procedure. There were six nested
models created to test causal structure invariance as described in Table .

Table 32
Description of Nested Structural Model
Model
Unconstrained
Measurement weights
Structural weights
Structural covariances
Structural residuals
Measurement residuals

Constraint
Unconstrained + Regression weights of measurement items.
Measurement weight model + Regression weights of relationships.
Structural Weight Model + Covariances between latent variables.
Structural covariance model + Variance of structural residuals
Structural residual model + Variance of measurement error
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The χ2 test results in Table 33 show that all the models, with the exception of the
structural weight model, were significantly different from the unconstrained model at
p = 0.05. The χ2 test results, which are too stringent, were presented here for reference
only, and the CFI difference criteria were used to assess the causal structure invariance
instead.
All of the CFI differences in Table 34 up to the structural residual model have
ΔCFI less than 0.01. Therefore, the research model has causal structural invariance up to
the structural residual level. Thus, it can be concluded that both the stop group and the
software group have the same causal structure model estimated except for the
measurement residual.

Table 33
Nested Structural Model Comparison (Assume Unconstrained Model to be Corrected)
Model
Unconstrained
Measurement weights
Structural weights
Structural covariances
Structural residuals
Measurement residuals

χ2
645.852
674.370
677.461
720.409
747.917
888.595

df
384
399
406
421
423
445

Table 34
CFI of the Nested Measurement Models
Model
CFI
Unconstrained
0.956
Measurement weights
0.954
Structural weights
0.955
Structural covariances
0.950
Structural residuals
0.946
Measurement residuals
0.926

ΔCFI
0.002
0.001
0.006
0.010
0.030
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Δ χ2
28.519
31.609
74.557
102.065
242.743

Δdf
15
22
37
39
61

p
0.019
0.084
0.000
0.000
0.000

CHAPTER 6:
DISCUSSION
The analysis and results from the previous chapters show that the research model
fits well with the empirical data as indicated by all the fit indices. However, there are two
relationships in the model that do not perform as expected, i.e., the effect of
recommended effectiveness and threat evaluation on behavioral intention were found to
be nonsignificant. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the meaning of the findings
and compare them with prior PMT research.
Research Model
The research model differs from the standard PMT in many ways. First, the most
important change is that this research model specifies cognitive dissonance as a mediator
between threat evaluation and behavioral intention. Second, perceived effectiveness of
current behavior is included in the model. Third, threat severity and vulnerability to the
threat are proposed to be components of threat belief in order to explain threat evaluation.
Fourth, risk behavior is proposed to have multiple impacts, thus a need for inclusion of
multiple threat beliefs and measurements of effectiveness constructs. Finally, only
foregone rewards or opportunity costs are included in the model as part of the perceived
cost, in which is in contrast to prior research.
The research model fits the data very well, as indicated by the fit indices (see
Table 20). This means that improvements to the PMT are plausible, and the intention to
perform phishing protection can be explained by the research model for the population of
generalization.
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The scope and research methodology of this study can be used to test all
propositions of the main research model (Proposition 1 to 9) with the exception of
Proposition 6, which cannot be tested by a survey. The summary of the findings for each
proposition are listed in Table 35. Each proposition that can be confirmed or rejected by
this study is discussed in detail as follows.
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Table 35
Summary of Propositions and Results
Proposition
1.1 Direct loss threat belief influences threat evaluations.

p value
0.003

Meaning
The overall phishing threat evaluations are strongly related to the
belief about direct loss threat.

1.2 Malware threat belief influences threat evaluations.

< 0.001 The overall phishing threat evaluations are strongly related to the
belief about malware threat.

1.3 Identity theft threat belief influences threat evaluations.

< 0.001 The overall phishing threat evaluations are strongly related to the
belief about identity theft threat.

2. Threat evaluations positively influence cognitive
dissonance.

< 0.001 Cognitive dissonance is strongly related to the overall phishing
threat evaluation.

3. Effectiveness of current behavior negatively influences
cognitive dissonance.

< 0.001 The cognitive dissonance will be lower, if the individual perceives
that the current behavior is highly effective against phishing.

4. Threat evaluations positively influence intentions to
perform recommended protective behaviors.

0.496

5. Cognitive dissonance positively influences intentions to
perform recommended protective behaviors.

0.005

7. Perceived effectiveness of the recommended protective
behavior positively influences intentions to perform the
recommended protective behavior.

0.085

Threat evaluations do not have significant direct effect on
intentions to perform recommended protection behaviors.
Intentions to perform recommended protective behaviors are strongly

related to the cognitive dissonance.
Perceived effectiveness of the recommended protective behavior do not
have significant effect on intentions to perform recommended
protection behaviors.

8. Perceived self-efficacy to perform the recommended
protective behavior positively influences intentions to
perform the recommended protective behavior.

< 0.001 Intentions to perform recommended protective behaviors are strongly
related to the perceived self-efficacy.

9. Perceived costs of the recommended protective behavior
negatively influence intentions to perform the
recommended protective behavior.

< 0.001 Intentions to perform recommended protective behaviors are strongly
related to the perceived cost.
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Proposition 1
All three threat beliefs were found to have statistically significant positive effects
on threat evaluation. This finding confirms the expectation of Proposition 1 that the
overall threat evaluation can be explained by the combined effect of multiple threat
beliefs. In addition, the beliefs about direct loss, malware, and identity theft seem to have
about the same level of effect on overall phishing threat evaluation. In terms of the
squared multiple correlations, these three threat beliefs explained about 45% of threat
evaluation variance.
Proposition 2
This proposition is confirmed: overall threat evaluation was found to have a
strong positive effect on cognitive dissonance. This finding means that cognitive
dissonance, or the conflict between current attitude about phishing and current behavior,
is strongly related to the overall phishing threat evaluation.
Proposition 3
The perceived effectiveness of current behavior against the phishing threat was
found to have a strong negative effect on cognitive dissonance, thus confirming
Proposition 3. This means that the cognitive dissonance that individuals feel will be lower
if the individual perceives that the current behavior is highly effective against phishing.
The combination of the Proposition 2 and the Proposition 3 is a submodel that
directly defines cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance occurs when effectiveness of
current behavior is not enough to cancel the phishing threat. The finding confirms these
relationships, since the effects of threat evaluation and current effectiveness on cognitive
dissonance have opposite signs.
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Proposition 4
Threat evaluation was not found to have any statistically significant direct effect
on intention to perform the recommended protection. Therefore, the empirical data did
not support Proposition 4. It should be noted here that threat evaluation and behavioral
intention had statistically significant bivariate correlations at p < 0.01 (see Table 15). In
addition, the total effect of threat evaluation on behavioral intention was statistically
significant at p < 0.01.
Proposition 5
Cognitive dissonance was found to have statistically significant effects on
intention to perform the recommended protection. That means that Proposition 5 was
supported. According to Festinger (1957), cognitive dissonance has a motivational effect,
since individuals will try to change attitudes or behaviors to reduce the dissonance. The
significant effect of cognitive dissonance on the intention to perform the recommended
protection partially confirms Festinger’s proposition because the cognitive dissonance
that emerges from the imbalance between phishing threats and current behavior has direct
effects on intention to change behavior to the recommended protection.
Proposition 2 through Proposition 5, which are the upper part of the research
model (see Figure 11), represent the threat appraisal process. Overall, the results
supported the model with an exception of the direct effect from threat evaluation to
behavioral intention, which is not only nonsignificant but also close to a zero weight
(0.04). As noted before, both bivariate correlation of threat evaluation and behavioral
intention and the total effect of threat evaluation on behavioral intention are statistically
significant. From this, it can be concluded that the effect of threat evaluation on
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behavioral intention is fully mediated by cognitive dissonance. Stated differently,
cognitive dissonance is a perfect mediator between threat evaluation and behavioral
intention (e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986).
Proposition 6
Proposition 6 cannot be confirmed or rejected by this study due to the limitation
of the research methodology. As the measurements of both cognitive dissonance and
behavioral intention do not have a true zero point, neither the case of zero cognitive
dissonance nor zero intention can be found. Therefore, a necessary condition cannot be
tested by survey methodology with the measurements based on the current constructs.
Proposition 7
Perceived effectiveness of the recommended phishing protection was not found to
have a statistically significant effect on intention to perform that protection, thus,
Proposition 7 is rejected. This finding is inconsistent with prior PMT research that
generally found significant effects. Further investigation found that (1) the effect of
effectiveness of the recommended protection on behavioral intention is significant at
p = 0.085, (2) it also highly correlates with perceived cost and self-efficacy, and (3) the
bivariate correlation with behavioral intention is statistically significant at p < 0.01. From
these three findings, we can reason that perceived effectiveness of recommended
protection has nonsignificant effects due to potential multicollinearity of independent
variables. This possible explanation was confirmed partially by my research model,
which excluded perceived cost and self-efficacy. In this partial model, the regression
weight of recommended effectiveness to behavioral intention became 0.18 (standardized
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weight 0.35) at p < 0.001. However, the explained variance of behavioral intention was
reduced to just 0.17 compared to 0.39 of the full model.
Proposition 8
Perceived self-efficacy to perform the recommended phishing protection was
found to have a statistically significant effect on intention to perform the protection. In
addition, perceived self-efficacy was found to have the largest effect of all independent
variables.
Proposition 9
Perceived cost of recommended phishing protection was found to have a
statistically significant effect on intention to perform the protection. Perceived cost was
also found to have the second largest effect on behavioral intention. However, only the
opportunity cost items were included in the perceived cost construct. Thus, it can be
concluded that only opportunity costs that result from the protection behavior have
statistically significant effects on intention to perform the recommended phishing
protection. The reason that the direct cost of recommended protection does not influence
the intention to perform the recommended act may be that the direct costs of
recommended phishing protection in this study (i.e., stop response to phishing, using
browser and e-mail client phishing protection features, and using antimalware software)
are very small or negligible. Therefore, the subjects in this study likely did not include
the direct cost in the protection appraisal process.
The combination of Proposition 7 through Proposition 9 is the protection
appraisal process (see Figure 11). The finding was consistent with prior PMT research in
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that perceived self-efficacy and perceived cost usually have the largest effect on
behavioral intention (Floyd et al., 2000; Milne et al., 2000).
Group Analysis
The goal of the group analysis in this study is to test whether the same phishing
protection model can be applied to various types of the phishing protection. Originally,
there were three recommended protections: stop responding to the phishing, using
antiphishing browsers and e-mail clients, and using anti-malware software. However, the
difference between the recommended appraisal variables between the antiphishing
browser and using anti-malware software groups was not statistically significant.
Therefore, these two groups were combined into a general “software” group and
compared with the stop group in the group analysis. The results of group analysis showed
that the same model with the same estimated parameter can be used to explain the
intentions to perform the recommended phishing protection for both groups. This means
that the research model is robust enough to be used to explain the intention to perform
various phishing protections.
Phishing Protection Intention
In the revised PMT, Rogers (1983) postulated that the motivation or the intention
to perform the recommended protection against the threat is influenced by two cognitive
processes. The first process is the threat appraisal process, in which the individual
evaluates the threat or risky behavior based on the severity of the threat, vulnerability to
the threat, and the rewards from engaging in risky behavior. The second process is the
coping appraisal, in which the individual evaluates the protection behavior based on the
protection cost, self-efficacy, and effectiveness of the protection. In other words, the
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PMT model suggests that the increasing of severity of the threat, vulnerability to the
threat, self-efficacy, or effectiveness of the protection will increase the intention to
perform protection behavior. On the other hand, increasing of the reward from risky
behavior and the cost of protection will result in decreasing the intention to perform
protection behavior.
The results from this study suggest a slightly different process. Like the PMT
model, the intention to protect oneself against phishing threats was influenced by two
cognitive processes—the threat appraisal process and the coping appraisal process. In the
threat appraisal process, the individual evaluates not only the phishing threat but also the
effectiveness of the current behavior. As suggested by the results, the phishing threat
evaluation does not have a direct effect on intention to perform the phishing protection,
but the combined effect of the threat evaluation and the current protection through
cognitive dissonance influences the intention to perform the phishing protection behavior.
In other words, the perception that the phishing threat is higher, alone, is not enough to
cause the individual to change behavior, but rather the intention to change behavior is
influenced by the perception that the phishing threat is higher combined with the
perception that the current behavior is not effective enough.
In the coping appraisal process, the individual evaluates the recommended
phishing protection based on perceived cost and self-efficacy. The effectiveness of
phishing protection, while important, does not explain the variance of intention to
perform the protection. In addition, the effect of coping appraisal processes was found to
be much larger than the effect of threat appraisal processes. This may imply that once the
individual realizes that she or he needs to change because the current protection is not
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effective enough against the threat, the decision to accept the recommended phishing
protection is based mainly on the coping appraisal. It can also imply that the two
processes are sequential, as in the OPM (Tanner et al., 1991). However, the sequential
nature of the threat appraisal and the coping appraisal cannot be tested in the current
study and thus cannot be confirmed or rejected by the current data.
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CHAPTER 7:
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This final chapter provides implications, limitations, and directions of the future
research. The study developed a research model to explain a cognitive process of
individual decision making involving the protection of oneself against phishing threats.
The research model was based mainly on the protection motivation theory (Maddux &
Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1983; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997) but was improved by
applying constructs and measurements from the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1988;
Ajzen, 1991) and the cognitive dissonance theory (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Festinger,
1957).
The research model that explains phishing protection decisions consists of two
processes, including the threat appraisal process and the coping or protection appraisal
process. In the threat appraisal process, the individual evaluates the threats from phishing
against the effectiveness of current behavior. Cognitive dissonance will emerge if she or
he perceives that the current behavior is not effective enough against the phishing threats.
In the protection appraisal process, the individual evaluates the recommended protection
by assessing whether he or she can perform it or not (perceived self-efficacy), by
considering protection costs, and by the effectiveness of the recommendation. The results
of these two cognitive appraisal processes are hypothesized to have a direct effect on the
intention to perform the recommended phishing protection.
The analysis found that the research model fits very well with the empirical data,
as indicated by overall fit indices. Out of eight hypothesized relationships, six were found
to be statistically significant. The nonsignificant relationships were the direct effect of
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perceived phishing threat levels on the intention to perform the recommended phishing
protection and the effect of perceived effectiveness of recommended phishing protection
on the intention to perform the recommended phishing protection.
Scientific and Theoretical Implications
The main objective of this study was to study ways to motivate individuals to
protect themselves from risky computer-use behaviors such as responding to phishing
attempts. The protection behavior advocated in the study differs from other adoption
behavior in that if the protection works well, the individual may perceive only minor
benefits while experiencing some protection costs. However, if an individual fails to
protect him or herself, then there will be a major negative impact. This type of
phenomena is fairly common but largely ignored in Management Information Systems
(MIS) research. Currently, such phenomena have been explained by general behavioral
theory and the technology acceptance model (TAM), which focuses on immediate
benefits rather than possible future damages. Therefore, the major contribution of this
study is to develop a specific theory to be used to explain this protective behavior.
This study adopted the protection motivation theory (PMT) as an underlying
theoretical model. The PMT model is relatively new in MIS research and has been used
in only a few studies. However, it is a well-known theory in health psychology and health
marketing areas (Weinstein, 1993). This study extends the application of the PMT into
the information security area. Unlike health-related threats, information security threats
are typically not fearful events. Therefore, this study demonstrated that the PMT can be
applied to threat areas that do not typically generate large amounts of fear in perceivers.
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This study not only extended the application of the PMT but also improved the
PMT model to increase its explanatory power. The major academic contribution is the
introduction of the threat-current effectiveness-cognitive dissonance relationship to the
PMT, which helps to explain of the effect of current behavior on the motivation to change
behavior. The results of this study also validated the cognitive dissonance theory in the
PMT context, since it confirmed that cognitive dissonance is related to the differences
between perceived effectiveness of current behavior and resulting attitudes toward
threats.
Another theoretical contribution of this study is the inclusion of multiple threats in
the model. In prior PMT research, the model was typically constructed on the assumption
of a single threat, which may not be realistic in computer security scenarios. In some
studies (e.g., Schoenbachler & Whittler, 1996), the risky behavior under investigation
resulted in multiple threats, but the threats were only investigated in the model one at a
time rather than all at once. By using theoretical guidance from the theory of planned
behavior (TPB), threat severity and vulnerability to the threat were redefined as a
component of threat beliefs in the PMT tested here. As is the case in the TPB, in this
version of the PMT, individuals can hold multiple threat beliefs about a target behavior.
In the case at hand, that would depend on the number of threats that a given risky
behavior could potentially produce. Even with multiple threat beliefs, the individual is
hypothesized to assess the situation based on an overall combined (i.e., additive)
assessment of threats.
The next contribution of this study is the introduction to the evolving PMT of the
threat evaluation construct that refers to the overall evaluation of the threat or the attitude
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toward the threat. The relationships of threat beliefs, threat evaluation, and behavioral
intention are similar in operation and concept to the belief, attitude, and intention
relationships in the TPB. By defining threat evaluations in the PMT the same way
attitude is defined in the TPB, a better construct definition and measurement approach is
the result, which will aid future research in terms of both measurement design and model
comparisons across theories.
The statistically nonsignificant direct effect of phishing threat evaluations on the
intention to perform the recommended protection also has major implications for
evolving PMT development. In prior research on the PMT, the threat variables were
generally found to have statistically significant effects on intention. However, this study
found that the only significant effect of phishing threat evaluations on intention to
perform phishing protection was an indirect effect through cognitive dissonance. This
finding emphasizes the importance of cognitive dissonance as the mediator between
threat evaluation and behavioral intention, which is a theoretically interesting outcome.
Finally, the statistically nonsignificant effect of perceived effectiveness of the
recommended protection on intention to perform the protection was an unexpected
finding. However, it was found to be almost significant (p = 0.09) and could be found to
be statistically significant in a larger sample size. Therefore, the perceived effectiveness
of recommended protection is still warranted to be included in the model and needs
further investigation in future research on PMT.
Practical Implications
There are a number of practical implications based on this research. As phishing
threats become a major problem for internet users, many organizations, including
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financial institutions, educational institutions, e-commerce sites, public services, and
internet service providers, will try to raise awareness about phishing threats and will hope
that their clients or customers will respond effectively to deal with the threat.
A majority of the messages that have been sent to internet users are about the
possible threats both in form of possible damage from phishing (severity) and the
likelihood of becoming a victim of phishing (vulnerability). To a lesser extent, warning
messages also include information about recommended phishing protections, but the
majority of such warning messages do not include information about the cost of phishing
protection, the effectiveness of the recommended protection, or the degree of ease related
to protecting one’s self.
The intervention messages that have been used so far in PMT research may have
some success in raising awareness about phishing. However, based on the results of this
study, awareness about the phishing threat alone is not enough to motivate internet users
to protect themselves. As the threat appraisal process suggests, intervention messages
should not only convey that the phishing threat level is high but also indicate that the
current protection methods employed by the average user are not effective against the
phishing threat. Nonetheless, the self-belief that one can successfully perform the
protection and the belief that the protection cost is reasonable are more important in
producing the desired response than the simple realization that the threat represented is
greater than the current protection can handle. Even though this study found that
effectiveness of the recommended protection does not have a significant effect on the
intention to perform the recommended protection, it is still important that the
recommended protection is an effective one.
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In summary, for phishing protection intervention messages to be effective, they
should persuade intervention targets of the following key points:
(1) Respondents should be persuaded that the phishing threat is real and that the
impact is high, as in-line with conventional PMT approaches. For example, the
intervention should include messages to indicate the likelihood that respondents could
easily be a phishing victim and inform them of the possible financial and nonfinancial
damages that could arise.
(2) The intervention should persuade perceivers that the current protection
modality is not effective against the phishing threat. For example, it should point out that
phishing detection based on human recognition heuristics alone is not effective enough
against sophisticated phishing schemes. This persuasive approach can also be supported
by evidence that the number of phishing victims is still on the rise although most internet
users already know about phishing threats.
(3) The intervention should emphasize that phishing protection is highly effective
against the phishing threat. As this study shows, the awareness of the threat alone has
only a minor effect on the intention to adopt the effective phishing protection method
advocated. The recommended phishing protection should be easy to perform and should
also have a reasonably low cost.
(4) The intervention message should persuade internet users to think that
responding to the phishing message does not have any specific benefit. Therefore, they
can protect themselves without losing anything or giving up what might be perceived as
an attractive opportunity to respond to an interesting promotional offer.
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For other security risk behaviors, these implications should still hold true to some
extent. However, the relative importance of the persuasion message will be different
according to threat type and context, and the effectiveness of the approach demonstrated
here should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Limitations
Despite every effort to achieve the research objective, this study still has some
limitations due to the trade-off between the resources available to support the study and
the desired level of rigor for model development. As should be the case with every
important test of theory, the constraints of finances, time, and access to subjects limit the
choices of methodology, subject groups and size, and thus the scope of the study. There
were three sources of limitations in this study as related to the sample, the research
methodology, and the scope of the model.
The first limitation relates to the subjects of the study. Using only college students
limits the generalizability of the results to other populations. However, students are easily
accessible and are prime targets of phishing exploits. The other advantages of student
samples are the modest costs and time requirements associated with obtaining a large
sample size; these constraints are lower with students than with many other sources of
data. Secondly, the response rate is high because the survey was performed in scheduled
classes and most students present were willing to volunteer. In addition, a third of internet
users fall within the same age range of typical student samples (Jones & Fox, 2009), and
students are generally very experienced and active internet users. Therefore, college
students can be considered prime targets for phishing protection interventions, since they
are likely the prime targets for exploits. Even so, the results from this study, especially
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with regard to the relative importance of the independent variables in affecting the
behavioral intention outcome cannot be generalized without further exploration and
replication to the larger population of overall internet users.
The research method employed in this study was also a limitation. This study used
the survey methodology instead of the experimental designs that were normally used in
prior PMT research. The advantage of survey methodology is that it can generate larger
sample size than experimental design under the same resource constrain. But despite the
advantage of this methodology over others, it has some limitations that should be noted
here. Survey research, particularly with convenience samples (as seen in this study),
cannot be used to definitively prove causal relationship between independent and
dependent variables. Therefore, the hypothesized model can only be partially confirmed;
future research should test the causal relationships. Also, this methodology cannot be
used to test whether cognitive dissonance is a necessary condition to perform
recommended protection evaluation process; its role as a mediator was demonstrated, but
more specifically focused work will be required to fully explore that relationship.
Finally, the research model also has some limitations that should be noted. The
scope of the model is limited to the cognitive processes of the individuals who encounter
new information about phishing threats and recommended phishing protections.
Therefore, the model does not include considerations of message acceptance or the
persuasion process that occur coincidentally with the cognitive processes. The scope of
the research model was limited to the cognitive process steps necessary to make the
advocated PMT approach comparable to the TPB. Hence, the research model might have
omitted other variables that could potentially have significant effects on intentions to
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perform the phishing protection but which are not related to the cognitive processes
specified. Though limiting the scope and the number of variables included in the model
helped make it more parsimonious, this was achieved at the cost of generality. This tradeoff is found in most theoretical tests of cognitive models.
Directions for Future Research
The implications of this study provide the foundation for future information
security behavioral research as well as research areas that intend to explain the intention
to perform a protection or avoid a risky behavior. The current study is only the first step
toward improving the general PMT model. To further improve knowledge in this area,
future research should continue refining the constructs and measures in the model. Future
research should also replicate this study in the context of other information security
behaviors as well as other risky behaviors. In addition, the model should be tested in both
high- and low-fear behaviors to make it comparable to other fear appeal models.
Other possible future research questions that could be drawn from this study
involve how to actually have practical impact on the independent variables that were
found to have an effect on intentions to protect one’s self. In other words, there would be
the question as to how to persuade the subject to change perceptions about threat level,
current protection, self-efficacy, effectiveness of the recommended protection, and the
cost of protection in ways that will increase the chance of accepting the recommendation.
Finally, the model could be further extended to explain the intention to perform
putatively beneficial behaviors that individuals may wrongly believe to correspond to
some (weak or unimportant) threat. In other words, the model could be used to explain
why people take actions that would not be warranted in the face of mild threats. This
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extended model would be the converse of the current research model in that an individual
should have intentions to perform this beneficial behavior if the threat is low, if effective
protection exists, if that protection can be easily performed, if the cost of protection is
low, and if the opportunity cost of not performing the risky behavior is high.
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APPENDIX A:
THREAT MESSAGES PRETEST
Threat Message with Phishing Examples
Exhibit 1: E-mail from Linkedin.com
From: “David Burrows” <support@linkedin.com>
Subject: RE: business contacts
To: vcomeson@memphis.edu
Date: Monday, September 22 , 2008, 9:38 AM
Veti
We managed to export the list of business contacts you have asked for.
The name, address, phone#, e-mail address and website are included. The list is
attached to this message. After you check it, could you please let me know if
it is complete so we can close the support ticket opened on this matter.
Thank you for using LinkedIn
David Burrows
Technical Support Department
-----Original Message----From: “Veti Comesongsri” <vcomeson@memphis.edu>
Subject: business contacts
To: support@linkedin.com
Date: Friday, September 19 , 2008, 11:38 AM
I would like to know if it is possible to export my business contact list
from LinkedIn and save it on my hard drive.
I have tried to do that but it seems that the website stops responding
after I press export. Can you export it and send it to me ASAP? It's
urgent.
Thank you
Veti Comesongsri

Contact.exe
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Exhibit 2: Macbook Pro for Sale on Craigslis.org

Apple Macbook Pro Core 2 Duo 2.16 ghz - $680 (Memphis)
Reply to: sale-4kdjx-00000000@craigslist.org
Date: 2009-03-13, 1:59AM CDT
Selling a slightly used 15.4″ Macbook Pro. I’m asking for $680/obo but please do not lowball me, I am in no
hurry to sell this machine. I use it only for word processing and internet use, so I don’t need such a powerful
laptop. Here are the specs:
- 15.4″ Macbook Pro
-2.16 Ghz Core 2 Duo Processor
-2 Gigs Ram
-100 Gig HD
-Superdrive DVD+-RW Drive
-Airport Extreme
-Axio Hardsleeve
Preloaded with
-Adobe Creative Suite CS3
-Microsoft Office 2008
-Mac OSX Leopard 10.5
-Final Cut Pro Studio
•
•

Location: Memphis
it's NOT ok to contact this poster with services or other commercial interests

PostingID: 1073000019

135

Exhibit 3: E-mail from IRS
From: “Internal Revenue Service” <stimulus@irs.gov>
Subject: Get 2009 Economic Stimulus Refund ($1,800 )
To: vcomeson@memphis.edu
Date: Wednesday, February 25, 2009, 2:38 PM
Over 130 million Americans will receive refunds as
part of President Bush program to jumpstart the economy.
Our records indicate that you are qualified to receive the
2009 Economic Stimulus Refund.
The fastest and easiest way to receive your refund is by
direct deposit to your checking/savings account.
Please click on the link and fill out the form and submit
before April 18th, 2009 to ensure that your refund will be
processed as soon as possible.
Submitting your form on April 18th, 2009 or later means that
your refund will be delayed due to the volume of requests we
anticipate for the Economic Stimulus Refund.
To access Economic Stimulus Refund, please click here.
© Copyright 2009, Internal Revenue Service U.S.A. All rights reserved.

Exhibit 4: E-mail from Facebook
From: Facebook <wallmaster+hzpofozf@facebookmail.com>
Subject: Layde added you as a friend on Facebook…
Date: 18 June 2008 10:32:00 AM
To: undisclosed-recipients:;
Reply-To: noreply@facebookmail.com

layde added you as a friend on Facebook. We need you to confirm that you are, in
fact friends with layde.

To confirm this friend request, follow the link below;
http://www.facebook.com/n/?invit.php&pid=30060198&id=1050152953&op=1&subj=15810924
195&view=all&aid--1&old=15810924195?reqs.php

Thanks,
The Facebook Team
Want to control which emails you receive from Facebook? Go to:
http://www.facebook.com/editacount.php?notifications&md=ZnJpZW5kO2Zyb209ODU3MTgwND
Uy
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What do these Exhibits have in common?
The email message are all real and all of them are phishing messages that were
designed to get your personal information or to infect your computer with malware if you
respond to them. Most phishing attempts work because they are designed to appear to be
personally relevant to the recipient. In many case, the message was customized to display
the recipient name and other unique personal information, in order to create the look of
authenticity. In some cases, phishing takes advantage of basic human curiosity, presuming
that people might open attachments or follow hyperlinks just to learn what it is about.
As phishing becomes more prominent in University email accounts, every semester
the University of Memphis Chief Information Officer, Dr. Douglas E Hurley has sent out the
following warning about phishing to all students, faculty, and staff in order to raise
awareness about phishing exploits:
“Phishing attempts are escalating. Phishing attempts are fraudulent emails
requesting your personal information. These messages may appear to be sent from
someone that you normally do business with such as the University of Memphis or
your local bank. As more and more people are comfortable disclosing personal
information online, phishing attempts are increasing. It’s important to keep your
personal information secure.” Douglas E Hurley (2/12/2009)
Phishing attempts are related to identity theft. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) reports that identity theft has been increasing every year and that nearly 10 million
American were victims of identity theft in a recent year. According to industry technology
consultancy the Gartner Group, the average cost to an individual for identify theft victims is
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around $3,250, not including the time and trouble required to restore identity and credit
history files.
Threat Message without Phishing Examples
Phishing messages are designed to get your personal information or to infect your
computer with malware if you respond to them. Most phishing attempts work because they
are designed to appear to be personally relevant to the recipient. In many case, the message
was customized to display the recipient name and other unique personal information, in
order to create the look of authenticity. In some cases, phishing takes advantage of basic
human curiosity, presuming that people might open attachments or follow hyperlinks just to
learn what it is about.
As phishing becomes more prominent in University email accounts, every semester
the University of Memphis Chief Information Officer, Dr. Douglas E Hurley has sent out the
following warning about phishing to all students, faculty, and staff in order to raise
awareness about phishing exploits:
“Phishing attempts are escalating. Phishing attempts are fraudulent emails
requesting your personal information. These messages may appear to be sent from
someone that you normally do business with such as the University of Memphis or
your local bank. As more and more people are comfortable disclosing personal
information online, phishing attempts are increasing. It’s important to keep your
personal information secure.” Douglas E Hurley (2/12/2009)
Phishing attempts are related to identity theft. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) reports that identity theft has been increasing every year and that nearly 10 million
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American were victims of identity theft in a recent year. According to industry technology
consultancy the Gartner Group, the average cost to an individual for identify theft victims is
around $3,250, not including the time and trouble required to restore identity and credit
history files.
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APPENDIX B:
QUESTIONNAIRE
Instructions
1. Please read and fill out a consent form.
2. Please read an article about “phishing” and then answer an attached
questionnaire based on your beliefs about phishing.
3. After you finished, please return the consent form and the completed booklet to
a proctor.
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Management Information Systems
Fogelman College of Business and Economics
The University of Memphis
Title: Motivations for Technology Use
The purpose of this research study is to examine the factors that affect motivations to
avoid the threat from engage in file sharing. The result will help researchers and managers
understand how to motivate the users of Internet file sharing technology to protect
themselves.
The protection of participant is the top priority in designing this study. The following
methods will be used to protect participants’ privacy.
-

Participants will not be asked about information that can be used to identify
individual participant.
The consent form which participants sign will be stored separately from the
questionnaire, which will remain anonymous.
Data will be analyzed only in aggregated form; information on individual
respondents will not be reported in any form.

I, __________________________, hereby agree to participate as a volunteer in the
“Motivations for the Technology Use” research project.
I understand that I am free to refuse to participate or answer any question at any time
without prejudice to me. I further understand that I am free to withdraw from the research at
any time.
I understand that by agreeing to participate in this research and signing this form, I
do not waive any of my legal rights.

_____________________________________
Signature
____________________________________
Today's Date
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Phishing
Phishing messages are designed to get your personal information or to infect your
computer with malware if you respond to them. Most phishing attempts work because they
are designed to appear to be personally relevant to the recipient. In many case, the message
was customized to display the recipient name and other unique personal information, in
order to create the look of authenticity. In some cases, phishing takes advantage of basic
human curiosity, presuming that people might open attachments for follow hyperlinks just to
learn what it is about.
As phishing becomes more prominent in University email accounts, every semester
the University of Memphis Chief Information Officer, Dr. Douglas E Hurley has sent out the
following warning about phishing to all students, faculty, and staff in order to raise
awareness about phishing exploits:
“Phishing attempts are escalating. Phishing attempts are fraudulent emails
requesting your personal information. These messages may appear to be sent from
someone that you normally do business with such as the University of Memphis or
your local bank. As more and more people are comfortable disclosing personal
information online, phishing attempts are increasing. It’s important to keep your
personal information secure.” Douglas E Hurley (2/12/2009)
Phishing attempts are related to identity theft. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) reports that identity theft has been increasing every year and that nearly 10 million
American were victims of identity theft in a recent year. According to industry technology
consultancy the Gartner Group, the average cost to an individual for identify theft victims is
around $3,250, not including the time and trouble required to restore identity and credit
history files.
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Questionnaire
Section 1
In this section, please think about an average Internet user who regularly uses a web
browser and email.
1. The chance that response to phishing email or website will cause her or him to directly
lose money due to a scam is:
Unlikely ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Likely

2. The severity of potential loss due to scam from phishing for the average Internet user is:
Negligible ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Serious

3. For the average Internet user, the chance that responding to phishing will result in virus
or spyware infections is:
Unlikely ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Likely

4. For the average Internet user, if a computer were infected with a virus or spyware
resulting from phishing, the damage would be:
Negligible ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Serious

5. The chance that the average Internet user will fall victim of identity theft because of
phishing is:
Unlikely ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Likely

6. The damage from identity theft caused by phishing for an average user would be:
Negligible ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Serious

Section 2
Please rate the degree to which each of the following statements applies to you using
the scale “Never” to “Always”.
7. Thinking about phishing email and phishing website and the possible threats from them
makes me feel uneasy.
Never ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Always

8. I feel uncomfortable when I think about the possible damage that I could face from
response to phishing.
Never ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Always

9. The possibility that I might get in to trouble because of phishing bothers me.
Never ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Always
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Section 3
Based on overall evaluation of phishing, please rate overall threat from phishing for
average Internet user by using following scales:
Safe ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Dangerous
Riskless ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Risky
Non-Threatening ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Threatening
Harmless ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Noxious

Section 4
Please rate the following items by comparing your practice with an average Internet
user on scales rating “Significantly lower” to “Significantly higher”.
10. Compared to an average Internet user, the chance that you will lose money due to
phishing is:
Significantly lower ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Significantly higher

11. Compared to an average internet user, severity of losing money due to phishing is:
Significantly lower ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Significantly higher

12. Compared to an average Internet user, the chance that your computer will get a virus or
spyware from phishing is:
Significantly lower ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Significantly higher

13. Compared to an average Internet user, if your computer were inflected with a virus or
spyware, the damage would be:
Significantly lower ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Significantly higher

14. Compared to an average Internet user, the chance that you will be a victim of Identity
theft because of phishing is:
Significantly lower ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Significantly higher

15. Compared to an average Internet user, if you became a victim of identity theft, severity
would be:
Significantly lower ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Significantly higher
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How to Protect Yourself from Phishing
Responding to phishing is very risky and computer damage and identity theft are
sure to occur. Learning to identify phishing messages is the only way to be sure you are
protected from scams, identity theft, viruses and other malicious software. Therefore,
security experts recommend that we should learn how to identify phishing in order to be
completely safe from identity theft and malicious software.
Section 5
Please rate the degree to which each of the following statements applies to you using
the scale “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.
16. I am able to stop responding to suspicious messages and webpages to protect myself
from scam, computer virus threat, and identity theft.
Strongly disagree ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Strongly Agree

17. It is easy for me to stop responding to suspicious messages and webpages.
Strongly disagree ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Strongly Agree

18. I can stop responding to suspicious messages and webpages.
Strongly disagree ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Strongly Agree

If I stop responding to suspicious messages and webpages....
19. It will take a lot of my time and effort to use Internet.
Not at All ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ To a Great Extent

20. I may miss a real good deal.
Not at All ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ To a Great Extent

21. I will have to pay more.
Not at All ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ To a Great Extent
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Section 6
Please rate the following items by considering what would happen if you stopped
responding to suspicious messages and webpages.
22. Compared to an average internet user, if you stopped responding to suspicious messages
and webpages the chance that you will lose money due to phishing is:
Significantly lower ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Significantly higher

23. Compared to an average internet user, if you stopped responding to suspicious message
and webpages severity of losing money due to phishing that you will have is:
Significantly lower ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Significantly higher

24. Compared to an average Internet user, if you stopped responding to suspicious messages
and webpages the chance that your computer will get virus or spyware from phishing is:
Significantly lower ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Significantly higher

25. Compared to an average Internet user, if you stopped responding to suspicious messages
and webpages the damage from virus or spyware is:
Significantly lower ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Significantly higher

26. Compared to an average Internet user, if you stopped responding to suspicious messages
and webpages the chance that you will be a victim of Identity theft because of phishing
is:
Significantly lower ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Significantly higher

27. Compared to an average Internet user, if you stopped responding to suspicious messages
and webpages severity of identity theft is:
Significantly lower ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Significantly higher
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Section 7
Please rate the degree to which each of the following statements applies to you using
the scales “Probably Not” to “Definitely”.
28. I intend to stop responding to suspicious messages and webpages.
Probably Not ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Definitely

29. I plan to stop responding to suspicious messages and webpages.
Probably Not ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Definitely

30. I will try to stop responding to suspicious messages and webpages.
Probably Not ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Definitely

Section 8
Please rate the degree to which each of the following statements applies to you using
the scales “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.
31. I am satisfied with my interactions with my email provider.
Strongly disagree ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Strongly Agree

32. My experiences with my email provider have satisfied me.
Strongly disagree ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Strongly Agree

33. I am satisfied with assistance I have received from my email provider.
Strongly disagree ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Strongly Agree

34. The level of support I receive from my email provider is satisfactory to me.
Strongly disagree ____:____:____:____:____:____:____ Strongly Agree

Section 9
Please tell us about yourself.
35. Gender.
Female

Male

36. Work Status.
Full Time

Part Time

Doesn’t Work

Less than 16

16 to 25

26 to 35

36 to 45

More Than 45

37. Age Range.
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